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ABSTRACT 
The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 ignited an extensive and intractable debate that 
remained at the center of the state’s politics throughout the Revolutionary period. This 
debate encompassed disagreement over a broad range of questions relating to the 
relationship between government and society, many of which brought into question the 
implications of the concept of popular sovereignty for governmental structure and 
popular political agency. Competing notions regarding these issues, while expressed 
within a general framework of consensus concerning the source of political authority [the 
people], revealed fundamentally different visions of governmental order. Partisans 
presented these visions as inextricably connected to their respective understandings of the 
American Revolution. This debate suggests that constitutionalism and political ideology 
were closely connected to, and mutually informative of, one another during the 
Revolution and that factions within the Patriot cause perceived their differing visions of 
government and brands of constitutionalism as inseparable from the cause of the 
Revolution itself. 
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Introduction: Pennsylvania and the Revolution as a Constitutional Phenomenon 
“The time is now approaching, when the Colonies, will find themselves under a 
Necessity, of engaging in Earnest in this great and indispensable Work [the 
creation of new governments]. I have ever Thought it the most difficult and 
dangerous Part of the Business, Americans have to do, in this mighty Contest, to 
contrive some Method for the Colonies to glide insensibly, from the old 
Government, into a peaceable and contented Submission to new ones…At 
present, this sense of Necessity seems to be general, and Measures are taking 
which must terminate in a compleat Revolution. There is a Danger of 
Convulsions. But I hope, not great ones.”—John Adams, April 17761 
 
 
The American Revolution’s essential character and central concerns have been the 
objects of extensive scholarly debate. Historians have disagreed at length as to whether 
the Revolution was a contest, as Carl Becker famously put it, over “home rule or who 
should rule at home” but less attention has been given to debates within America over 
what home rule should ultimately look like.2 Further contention exists over whether the 
Revolution was fundamentally a political, social, or economic phenomenon and whether 
it decisively reshaped society within the newly formed American states.3 Perhaps the 
                                                      
1 John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 16, 1776 in ed. Robert Taylor, The Adams Papers, Papers of 
John Adams, vol. 4, February-August 1776 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 123-126. Accessed at 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0044.  
2 Carl L. Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (1909; reprint, 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 22. 
3 For examples of the constitutionally-attuned interpretation of the Revolution’s origins and character, see 
Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism (New York: New York 
University Press, 1932); John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 4 vols. 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986-1993); Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: 
Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain (New York: Knopf, 1972); Jack 
P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British 
Empire and the United States, 1607-1789 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Negotiated 
Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1994) and The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 
2011).  
For accounts that privilege examination of economic and social affairs over the assessment of constitutional 
and political development, see Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America 
(Princeton University Press, 1965) and The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New York: Franklin Watts, 
1973); Merrill Jensen, The American People and the American Revolution (Menasha, WI: George Banta, 
1970); The American Revolution within America (New York University Press, 1974); Gary Nash, The 
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only thing regarding which scholars can come to a consensus is that colonists in British 
North America engaged in an effort to separate themselves from the British empire and 
reshape their colonies into independent and sovereign states. 
 The case of the state constitutions shows the importance of ideology in 
Revolutionary America. While the movement to secure independence from Britain 
prompted domestic debate over social and economic affairs, discussion of constitutional 
and political matters predominated. The cause of drafting new constitutions commanded 
the attention of politically active individuals within each of the colonies. Although 
independence was formally declared by the Continental Congress in July of 1776, the 
Declaration written by Thomas Jefferson merely provided rhetorical flourish and 
intellectual justification to a process of separation that was already in some places being 
decisively finalized through the creation of state constitutions.4 The drafting and adoption 
of new constitutions signaled the colonies’ transformation into separate and distinct 
political societies whose ties to the British empire had been decisively severed. 
 The process of creating state constitutions prompted a broad range of debates over 
proper political structure and the relationship between the government and the governed. 
Nowhere was controversy over these issues as intense and influential as in Pennsylvania, 
where the state constitution eschewed prevailing notions about the balancing of power 
between the branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) of government, bicameralism, 
and the importance of a deferential element of politics. The authors of the Pennsylvania 
                                                      
Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
4 On the mostly symbolic function of the Declaration, see Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the 
Declaration of Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997). 
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constitution seized upon the implications embedded within the logic of popular 
sovereignty that had animated Whig grievances against British policy and instituted them 
within the structure of their new government.  
 Because the Pennsylvania constitution was such a decisive rejection of 
conventional assumptions about government, it sparked enormous debate. The 
constitution was the central issue of political contention in Pennsylvania from its 
inception in 1776 through its replacement in 1790. It was the defining concern of the 
state’s discourse during the Revolutionary period. The parameters of state politics 
adhered closely to the lines of disagreement over the constitution which emerged shortly 
following its publication for public consideration.  
 In the process of debating the constitution, its supporters, the Constitutionalists, 
and opponents, the Republicans, advanced distinct and competing visions of 
governmental structure. These visions implicated conflicting understandings of the 
implications of popular sovereignty, the notion that all political authority was ultimately 
derived from the people. Constitutionalists and Republicans alike affirmed the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, but they expressed altogether differing understandings of its 
implications. The Constitutionalists believed that, because the people reigned supreme, 
the legislature should be the preeminent branch of government so that the people’s 
interests predominated in governmental matters. This was a rejection of conventional 
assumptions about the need for a balance of power. Republicans agreed that the people 
were sovereign but thought that power needed to be diffused so that the influence of the 
electorate could be checked by various elements of government. Each branch of 
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government was representative, but Republicans believed that distinctions between them 
were essential to maintaining governmental stability. 
 Constitutionalists and Republicans associated their separate visions of political 
order with the American Revolution. Constitutionalists believed that, because the 
Revolution was an effort to secure popular control of government, it was imperative to 
create a constitution which clearly and directly established that principle as the reigning 
logic of government. Republicans argued that the constitution was such an affront to 
assumptions about government they regarded as universal and indispensable that it 
jeopardized the prospect of securing Pennsylvania’s independence. They further 
contended that the constitution’s failure to impose constraints on legislative power made 
the state Assembly an omnipotent and arbitrary institution—similar, they noted, to a 
Parliament which failed to recognize the boundaries inherent to the English Constitution. 
Thus, they argued, the constitution was a fundamental threat to the Revolutionary cause. 
 The Pennsylvania constitutional debate was both a contest between competing 
visions of political order and a referendum on the character and fate of the American 
Revolution. Historians have devoted considerable attention to the divisions that separated 
the constitution’s partisans and critics. They have stressed the radicalism of the authors 
and champions of the constitution and emphasized the conservative and reactionary 
tendencies of the constitution’s opponents, in the process telling a story of internal 
division predicated on conflicting constitutional visions.5 However, they have primarily 
                                                      
5 J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Democracy 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936); Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counterrevolution in 
Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942); Jackson Turner 
Main, Political Parties before the Constitution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 
175-211; Richard A. Ryerson, “Republican Theory and Partisan Reality in Revolutionary Pennsylvania: 
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examined the practical dimensions of the constitutional controversy, examining the 
actions of the state Assembly, assessing the composition of the Constitutionalist and 
Republican parties, and emphasizing the importance of economic and logistical concerns 
to political debates. These issues were important to state politics. However, they were not 
quite as central as the differences in constitutional ideology that separated 
Constitutionalists and Republicans and seemed to ensure that political reconciliation 
would be an impossible venture so long as the constitution remained intact.  
This study intends to redress this historiographical oversight by both asserting the 
primacy of ideological division in shaping state politics and assessing disagreement about 
the nature of the Revolution in Pennsylvania. Through a series of case studies, I 
demonstrate that the essential differences in the Constitutionalists’ and Republicans’ 
visions of political order provided the basis for their numerous disagreements on the 
constitution. Because Republicans insisted that the constitutions’ perceived problems 
could only be redressed by either substantively reshaping the constitution or abandoning 
it altogether and Constitutionalists remained steadfast in their insistence that the 
constitution’s maintenance was essential to securing the Revolution, Pennsylvania 
politics was fraught with interminable disagreement regarding the legitimacy and 
sustainability of the state’s source of fundamental law. 
This study has implications which extend beyond the study of Pennsylvania and 
relate generally to the study of the American Revolution. Consideration of constitutional 
                                                      
Toward a New View of the Constitutionalist Party,” in eds., Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, Sovereign 
States in an Age of Uncertainty (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981); Owen S. Ireland, “The 
Crux of Politics: Religion and Party in Pennsylvania, 1778-1789,” William and Mary Quarterly 42, no. 4 
(October, 1985), 453-475; Douglas Arnold, A Republican Revolution: Ideology and Politics in 
Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989). 
 
 
xi 
 
and political issues as sources of domestic disagreement has been largely abandoned in 
recent decades in favor of Neo-Progressive examinations of economic and social 
animosity and culturally minded assessments of the place of race and gender in the 
Revolution.6 While these approaches have produced useful insights into the 
Revolutionary era, they have failed to provide a comprehensive explanation for the 
differences in domestic outlook that characterized various elements of the movement for 
American independence. The Pennsylvania constitutional dispute demonstrates that 
differences in political and constitutional ideology were central to the divisions regarding 
the nature and purpose of the Revolution that emerged within the Patriot camp. Even in 
Pennsylvania, which hosted perhaps the most socially egalitarian contingent of adherents 
to the Patriot cause, questions of constitutional and political order eclipsed considerations 
of social and economic equality.  
Further, this study has relevance to the concept of an American Revolutionary 
settlement.7 The origins of the American Revolution and the contrast between nationalist 
and state sovereigntist visions have been examined at length. Less attention has been paid 
to the conflicting political visions that produced divisions within the Patriot cause prior to 
                                                      
6 For examples of this “Neo-Progressive” approach, see Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, 
Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999); Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006); 
Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” The Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the 
American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For examples of the cultural 
interpretation of the Revolution, see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, This Violent Empire: The Birth of an 
American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Robert G. Parkinson, 
The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2016). 
7 For examples, see John Murrin, “The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the 
Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816),” in ed., J.G.A. Pocock, Three 
British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton University Press, 1980), 368-453; Aaron N. Coleman, 
The American Revolution, State Sovereignty, and the American Constitutional Settlement, 1765-1800 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).  
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the resolution of hostilities with Great Britain. Pennsylvania furnishes a great deal of 
evidence that conflicting political visions between Whigs were extensive and heavily 
informed debates over the state constitutions. Before the American Revolution’s 
participants could debate the Revolution’s implications for national affairs, they had to 
determine its implications for state politics. The Pennsylvania constitutional debate is a 
prime example of an instance in which these questions were debated at length. 
 This study takes an episodic approach to covering debates over the Pennsylvania 
constitution, beginning with its adoption in the summer of 1776 and concluding with the 
adjournment of the state Council of Censors in 1784. Chapter One discusses the 
background of the American Revolution in Pennsylvania and addresses the content and 
general reception of the Pennsylvania constitution. Chapter Two examines the differing 
constitutional visions presented in the number of newspaper essays about the Frame of 
Government written in 1776 and 1777. Chapter Three assesses the debates of the state 
Council of Censors, a constitutionally established body charged with reviewing and 
proposing amendments to the state constitution. The concluding section examines the 
Pennsylvania constitutional debate as it relates to broader arguments about 
constitutionalism and the character and outcome of the American Revolution. 
 Although this project is limited in its scope and immediate objectives, it should 
nonetheless contribute to the scholarly understanding of the Pennsylvania constitution. It 
should also enhance the historical understanding of the ways in which constitutional and 
political ideology shaped American Whigs’ conflicting understandings of the American 
Revolution’s implications. It was, perhaps, only fitting that a struggle precipitated by a 
clash of conflicting constitutional interpretations should be the source of extensive 
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constitutional disagreement within the newly formed United States. The American 
Revolution was, at least in Pennsylvania, an internal struggle waged not over questions of 
economic and social equality (although those questions were certainly present and 
influential), but over distinct and seemingly incompatible visions of political order. These 
visions of political order delineated partisans’ interpretations of the Pennsylvania 
constitution, which were, in turn, intertwined with their conflicting understandings of the 
American Revolution. This study is an effort to make sense of these connections. 
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Chapter One: The Background, Content, and Reception of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution 
Political conflict defined Pennsylvania throughout the Imperial Crisis touched off 
by Parliament’s passing of the Stamp Act. Resistance to British imperial policies sparked 
resistance to the colony’s proprietary class, which had dominated politics for nearly a 
century, and also prompted hostility towards the colony’s substantial population of 
Quakers, who also wielded considerable authority under the proprietorship.8 
Revolutionary committees, associations, and militias became vehicles through which 
opposition was directed against not only the British empire’s policies, but the constituted 
authorities of Pennsylvania’s political scene. The colony’s middling and lower classes 
transformed the institutions established to protest British policies into instruments for 
corroding the stranglehold on Pennsylvania politics maintained by the proprietorship and 
the Quakers.9 
                                                      
8 On this development, see James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal 
Government and its Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). On Pennsylvania politics 
prior to the emergence of the American Patriot cause, see Alan Tully, Forming American Politics: Ideals, 
Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994); Richard Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth Century 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Chapter 8; Nathan Kozuskanich, “ ‘For 
the security and protection of the community’: The frontier and the makings of Pennsylvania 
constitutionalism,” (Ph.D. Diss., The Ohio State University, 2005); Christopher Pearl, “ ‘For the good order 
of government’: The American Revolution and the creation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1740-
1790,” (Ph.D. Diss., State University of New York-Binghamton, 2013), Chap. V. On Quakerism and 
Pennsylvania politics, see Jane E. Calvert, Quaker Constitutionalism and the Political Thought of John 
Dickinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
9 On the radical committees’ role in shaping Revolutionary politics in Pennsylvania, see Richard Alan 
Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) and Kenneth Owen, Political Community in 
Revolutionary Pennsylvania, 1774-1800 (Oxford University Press, 2018) Chapter I; on the militias’ 
importance, see Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and ‘Lower Sort’ 
during the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).  
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These circumstances enabled mechanics, tradesmen, and artisans to exercise an 
unprecedented degree of influence over politics. Intercolonial pressures brought about by 
the coming of the War of Independence solidified this impact. Pennsylvania’s political 
elite, preoccupied with preserving the proprietary frame of government, hedged their bets 
on reconciliation with Britain and opposed independence, even after the start of open 
hostilities between colonials and the empire. Clinging also to the pacifist tenets of 
Quakerism, they refused to cooperate with the Continental Congress’ requests for 
requisitions, maintaining hope of reconciliation with the imperial metropole.10 The 
unwillingness of the colony’s established governing figures to accept the cause of 
American independence facilitated the emergence of a popularly driven political 
movement. The colony’s radical element became the party of the American Revolution in 
Pennsylvania, displacing more moderate Whigs from leadership roles and assuming 
direction over the colony’s involvement in the Patriot cause. The mantle of forging 
intercolonial cooperation fell to them, as they cooperated with the Continental Congress 
and thus became, so far as national affairs were concerned, the group in control of 
administering the war effort.  
The radicals also undertook a campaign to replace the proprietorship, which they 
regarded as overly exclusionary in its dispensation of political power. They desired not 
only independence from Britain, but the replacement of the proprietary government with 
                                                      
10 Jessica Chopin Roney, “Government Without Arms, Arms Without Government: The Case of 
Pennsylvania,” in Patrick Griffin, Brian Schoen, Peter S. Onuf, and Robert G. Ingram, eds., Between 
Sovereignty and Anarchy: The Politics of Violence in the American Revolutionary Era (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2015), 84-86 
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a new political order.11 The extent to which they intended to abandon the precedents of 
the state’s colonial history and establish a government directly representing the will of 
the people became apparent through their creation of a new constitution for the state of 
Pennsylvania in July of 1776. 
On May 10, 1776, the Continental Congress issued a resolve recommending that 
each colony “adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the 
people, best conduce to the safety and happiness of their constituents in particular, and 
America in general.”12 Pennsylvania Whigs answered this call by convening in 
Philadelphia in July to hammer out a new constitution and establish statehood. Like the 
Revolutionary committees that preceded it, this convention was comprised mostly of 
mechanics, tradesmen, and artisans. Its members were men of common stock who had, 
with only a couple of notable exceptions, been untouched by much fame or distinction 
outside of Pennsylvania.13 Benjamin Franklin and the watchmaker David Rittenhouse 
were the only two attendees of much reputation, and Franklin was likely only present at 
the convention for a brief interlude. While these men had assumed roles of increasing 
political importance through their involvement with the Revolutionary associations and 
militia, they had been excluded from positions of defining influence in state politics prior 
to the onset of the War. Their engagement in, first, cooperating with the Continental 
                                                      
11 This was evident in their criticisms of the proprietorship in a string of pamphlets written early in 1776. 
See Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun, 169-170. See also, Benjamin L. Carp, Rebels Rising: Cities 
and the American Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2007), 172-212. 
12 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 342. Accessed at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?hlaw:4:./temp/~ammem_PvSt::.  
13 Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), 637. Also see Charles S. Olton, Artisans for Independence: Philadelphia 
Mechanics and the American Revolution (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1975). 
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Congress to provide supplies and manpower for the war effort and, secondly, framing the 
state constitution, catapulted them to preeminence in state affairs. The onset of armed 
conflict and the coming of independence had provided them with the opportunity to 
eclipse Pennsylvania’s entrenched political classes and become the principal movers in 
charting the state’s newfound course of government.14 
Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary leaders harbored tremendous disdain for the state’s 
former ruling class. Their resentment towards those they displaced from power animated 
their attempt at creating a government suitable to both the exigencies of war and the 
demands of popular politics. They denounced those who had previously dominated 
Pennsylvania politics as “a minority of rich men” and “an aristocratical junto” that had 
exerted every effort to “make the common and middle class of people their beasts of 
burden.”15 A letter circulated by the Philadelphia militia concerning the selection of 
delegates to the constitutional convention warned against electing “great and over-grown 
rich Men,” noting their propensity for framing “Distinctions in society.”16  
Their distaste for the elites who had previously been at the helm was so intense that 
the state constitutional convention considered “whether the future legislature of this State 
should have the power of lessening property when it became excessive in individuals.” A 
provision included in a preliminary draft of the Declaration of Rights set forth in the state 
constitution warned against “an enormous Proportion of Property vested in a few 
                                                      
14 Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun and Kenneth Owen, Political Community in Revolutionary 
Pennsylvania, 19-36. 
15 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1969), 86. 
16 John Murrin, “An American Ruling Class,” in Murrin, Rethinking America: From Empire to Republic 
(Oxford University Press, 2018), 263. 
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Individuals,” and provided that such a state of affairs should be “discouraged by the laws 
of the state.”17 These measures were rejected by the convention, but they attested to a 
levelling impulse within the state’s revolutionary movement. This levelling tendency 
aimed at a social restructuring of Pennsylvania politics, although it did not aspire to 
economically reshape society through government action.18 
I. The Pennsylvania Constitution 
I do declare that I do not hold myself bound to bear Allegiance to George the 
Third, King of Great-Britain; And that I will steadily and firmly and at all Times 
promote the most effectual means, according to the best of my Skill and 
Knowledge, to oppose the tyrannical Proceedings of the King and Parliament of 
Great-Britain against the American colonies, and support a Government in this 
State on the authority of the People only… 
 
--John Morris, July 177619 
 
This pledge, taken by the Secretary of Pennsylvania’s constitutional convention 
shortly after the body gathered, signaled the joint objectives of Pennsylvania’s most 
radical supporters of Independence. The authors of the Pennsylvania constitution thought 
that the realization of independence and the creation of a government grounded in the 
“authority of the people only” were interchangeable and synonymous. In their view, the 
American Revolution was not merely a struggle to throw off the yoke of British control. 
Independence was essential, but it needed to be accompanied by the creation of a state 
government which fully accounted for, and was energized by, the popular will. This 
objective, to a certain extent a product of the members’ outsider status and egalitarian 
leanings, but also a product of their conceptualization of popular sovereignty (a topic 
                                                      
17 Wood, Creation, 89. 
18 Murrin, “An American Ruling Class,” 264. 
19 Minutes of the proceedings of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, held at Philadelphia, the 
fifteenth day of July, 1776 (Philadelphia, 1776), 5. 
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addressed at greater length in the next chapter), led them to produce a constitution far 
more democratic than any of the other state constitutions created at the outset of the War 
for Independence.  
The constitution they devised consisted of three sections: an introduction 
enumerating the colony’s reasons for separating from Britain (similar to the various 
Declarations of Independency issued by the other state governments and the Declaration 
of Independence adopted by the Continental Congress), a fairly standard Declaration of 
Rights listing rights reserved to the commonwealth’s citizens, and a Frame of 
Government outlining the design and operation of the new state government.20   
The first two sections provoked minimal controversy. The Declaration of Rights 
was squarely a part of the Anglo-American tradition of enumerating individual rights.21 It 
established the individual right to life, liberty, property, happiness, and safety; the right to 
assemble to discuss political affairs and grievances, the right to bear arms; and religious 
freedom (an element reflecting Pennsylvania’s longstanding tradition of religious 
toleration). It counterposed those rights with the responsibilities of the citizenry: the 
payment of just taxes, military service, and the responsibility to “continually oversee” 
state officials.22 The Declaration reflected a variety of influences. The influence of the 
English common law was evident its enshrinement of liberties, the recognition of those 
rights as existing in the absence and in possible opposition to government attested to the 
                                                      
20 On the numerous Declarations of Independence adopted by the nascent American states, see Maier, 
American Scripture. 
21 On this tradition, see John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004); The Ancient Constitution and 
the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005). 
22 Constitution of Pennsylvania, September 28, 1776. Accessed at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp.,  
 
 
7 
 
influence of liberal thought, and republican influences were apparent in its articulation of 
the civic duties of citizens.23 It was the product of a multiplicity of influences and a 
testament to the intellectually heterogeneous nature of American constitutional thought.  
Most importantly, the Declaration articulated a vision of the people’s relationship 
to the government and the nature of political authority in Pennsylvania.24 It unequivocally 
announced both that the people were the source of political authority and that the 
constitution was intended to place them fully in control of Pennsylvania politics. 
Affirming popular sovereignty as the central tenet of the new state government, the 
Declaration expressed the people’s “sole, exclusive, and inherent right,” of “governing 
and regulating” the state’s internal police.25 It stated that power was “originally inherent 
in, and consequently derived from,” the people. This made “officers of government” the 
“trustees and servants” of the people.26 Government officials could therefore be 
“reduce[d]… to a private station,” should they prove unsatisfactory in the execution of 
                                                      
23 On the place of liberalism in Anglo-American thought and discourse, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal 
Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: 
The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Gary Wills, 
Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978); Joyce 
Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York University 
Press, 1984) and Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992); Lee Ward, The Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004); Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early 
American Political Theory, 1675-1775 (Cambridge University Press, 2011). On republicanism, see Bernard 
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); 
Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton University Press, 1975); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian 
Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Robert E. Shalhope, 
“Republicanism and Early American Historiography,” William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (April, 1982), 
334-56; Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79, no. 
1 (June, 1992), 11-38. 
24 Jeffrey L. Bauman, “Pennsylvania: Liberty, Independence, and Virtue,” in eds. George E. Connor and 
Christopher W. Hammons, The Constitutionalism of the American States (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2008), 250.  
25 State Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Clause III. 
26 Ibid., Clause IV. 
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their duties.27 The constitution acknowledged that the people had other recourses against 
governmental abuse of power that extended beyond the recalling of representatives. 
Affirming perhaps the greatest concession to popular sovereignty and sounding distinctly 
Lockean, the constitution recognized the people’s authority to “reform, alter,” or even to 
“abolish government,” in order to secure the general welfare.28  
These clauses set forth a vision of a government conducive to the collective good 
of the commonwealth and directly accountable to the governed. Section V’s expression 
of the importance of promoting the common welfare over the interests of private parties 
is a telling indicator of the authors’ commitment to a vision of popularly controlled 
government devoid of factional divisions. The constitution aimed for a promotion of 
collective interests over those of factions.29 
The Declaration established the “common benefit, protection, and security,” as 
the object of government. Eschewing the idea that government should provide an avenue 
for factions or interests to acquire power or wealth, it avowed that the government would 
not work towards “the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or 
sort of men.”30 These clauses set forth a vision of a government conducive to the 
collective good of the commonwealth and directly accountable to the governed. Unlike 
the interpretation of the imperial constitution presented by defenders of Parliament, the 
                                                      
27 Ibid., Clause VI. 
28 Ibid., Clause V. John Locke had sanctioned the popular overthrow of tyrannical governments in his 
Second Treatise of Government (London: 1689). 
29 Albrecht Koschnik and Kenneth Owen both contend that the supporters of the Pennsylvania constitution 
adhered to an ideal vision of their state in which factionalism and private interests were nonexistent and the 
general interests of the political community, construed as a homogeneous entity that encompassed the 
various constituent elements of society without bringing them into conflict with one another, prevailed. 
Koschnik, “Let a Common Interest Bind us Together”: Associations, Partisanship, and Culture in 
Philadelphia, 1775-1840 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007); Owen, Political Community. 
30 Ibid., Clause V. 
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Pennsylvania constitution affirmed the direct power of the people to exercise control over 
their government; there was no hint of virtual representation in the constitution’s 
introduction.31 Simultaneously promoting popular control and the general welfare, the 
constitution seemed to suggest that its framers thought those goals to be directly 
consonant with one another. 
The Frame of Government set forth in the constitution’s third and final section 
created an institutional framework that incorporated the ethos of democratic government 
explicated in the Declaration. It created a framework that made unprecedented 
concessions to the popular will. It established a unicameral legislature, one-year terms of 
office for state legislators, and mandated that laws be published for public consideration 
and that their enactment be delayed until after the adjournment of the legislative session 
in which they were introduced. These measures established mechanisms through which 
the electorate could exercise a tight control over their legislative affairs.32  
The constitution also dramatically expanded the scope of the electorate. It gave 
the franchise to all taxpaying males aged twenty-one or over.33 By eschewing property 
qualifications, the constitution established a political process in which wealth was not a 
barrier to participation. This ensured that the majority of the people (a term whose reach 
was still limited to adult white males) could engage in political affairs and that the 
                                                      
31 On the British attitude towards American appeals to actual representation, see Jack P. Greene, 
Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the 
United States, 1607-1788 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Eliga H. Gould, The Persistence of 
Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000). 
32 Pennsylvania Constitution, Frame of Government, Section II. 
33 Ibid., Section XXII. 
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interests of society as a whole, and not just the interests of property-holders, could be 
taken into account. 
While the constitution expanded the size of the electorate and thus, in 
combination with its grant of power to the legislature, promised to enhance the people’s 
influence on politics, its concessions to popular authority were not without qualification. 
The constitution mandated that officeholders take a loyalty oath under which they would 
pledge both to “be true and faithful to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and to “not 
directly or indirectly do any act or thing prejudicial or injurious to the constitution 
thereof.” Here, the constitution’s authors seemed to anticipate (incorrectly, it turned out) 
that the harmonious state of affairs envisioned in the constitution would be realized and 
that the constitution would enjoy general, if not unanimous, support across the state. 
Evidencing their conviction that the interests of the Commonwealth and the maintenance 
of the constitution were one and the same, the framers bound all public officials to swear 
allegiance to the constitution.34 
The constitution’s authors deviated from the proprietary frame of government in 
place throughout Pennsylvania’s history as a colony by creating an executive branch 
without a governor and by placing the judiciary under the thumb of the legislature. It 
established a plural executive comprised of a supreme executive council and a president, 
and it did not create an executive veto.35 The council consisted of twelve members, who 
were only allowed to serve for three years at a time before being barred from resuming 
                                                      
34 Pennsylvania Constitution, “Oath or Affirmation of Allegiance.” 
35 Ibid., Section III.  
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office for a period of four years.36 The judicial branch was not afforded the customary 
protections it had previously received under the propriety government. Justices were 
appointed by the Council for seven years terms and could be reappointed--but they were 
subject to removal by the Assembly at any time, a power which later brought 
controversy.37 These provisions placed the executive and judicial branches in a 
subordinate position vis a vis the state legislature. The executive could not check the 
actions of the legislature--and was therefore unable to prevent the Assembly from 
removing justices of the state Supreme Court at will. The constitution thus effectively 
gave the legislature preeminence in the new state government. 
These provisions signaled a radical departure from traditional Anglo-American 
notions regarding the separation of powers, expressed most notably in Montesquieu’s The 
Spirit of the Laws.38 Legislative preeminence, generally brought about through the 
actions of the lower houses of the colonial assemblies, had been a trend in the thirteen 
colonies throughout the eighteenth century. However, never had an American charter or 
constitution established so much formal power in a legislature and so clearly afforded the 
executive and judicial components such a clearly secondary place in the distribution of 
power.39 The framers of the Pennsylvania constitution appear to have shared with their 
counterparts in the other states an abiding fear of executive overreach that led them to 
                                                      
36 Ibid., Section XIX. 
37 Ibid., Section XXIII. 
38 Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748). 
39 On the growing influence of the lower houses of the colonial assemblies during the eighteenth century, 
see Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 
1689-1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963) and “The Role of the Lower Houses of 
Assembly in Eighteenth Century Politics,” in Negotiated Authorities, 163-84. For a comprehensive look at 
the colonial charters and state constitutions, see Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
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create an ineffectual and subservient executive component. However, they went well 
beyond the other state constitutions by creating an executive council, rather than a 
governor, and providing for no executive veto over laws passed by the legislature.  
It is difficult to identify the direct inspiration for the system of government 
created under the constitution. Some of the frame of government’s features had been 
proposed in pamphlets published shortly before the constitutional convention met.40 
While the shortage of extant records detailing the convention’s debates makes 
determining the influences of the constitution’s framers a nearly impossible task, it is 
probably fair to suggest that they were guided by these proposals. Thomas Paine likely 
furnished further influence, as he was closely associated with several the convention’s 
members and had promoted unicameralism in Common Sense.41 
Whatever their influences and inspirations, the authors of the state constitution 
created a system of government remarkably different from both the charters of the 
colonial period and the constitutions their contemporaries from other states were writing. 
In creating a unicameral legislature with the power to dominate state politics, the 
constitution’s authors took the implications of the concept of popular sovereignty to more 
extreme conclusions than any of their counterparts. The Frame of Government was an 
attempt to create political institutions capable of facilitating rule by the people and, by 
extension, militating against the dominance of the elite interests that had traditionally 
                                                      
40 See An Essay of a Frame of Government for Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1776); Four Letters on 
Interesting Subjects (Philadelphia, 1776); The Genuine Principles of the Ancient Saxon, or English 
Constitution…With some Observations on their peculiar fitness…for Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1776). 
41 Thomas Paine, Common Sense in ed. Moncure Daniel Conway, The Writings of Thomas Paine, vol. I 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), accessed at https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1776-paine-common-
sense-pamphlet. On Paine’s association with radical Whig politics in Pennsylvania, see Eric Foner, Tom 
Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), chapter IV. 
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been at the helm of Pennsylvania politics. The constitution established a framework for 
government that, rather than indirectly and dispassionately representing the interests of 
the people, was directly subject to their oversight and control.  
The governmental framework established under the constitution was animated by 
the concept of popular sovereignty, or the notion that all political authority was derived 
from the people.42 This idea commanded almost universal acknowledgment among 
Americans. It was a common truism that the people were sovereign. However, most 
Americans in 1776 still thought that, while in theory sovereignty resided with the people, 
carefully calculated constraints on the political agency of the people were necessary to 
ensure governmental stability.43 
The authors of the Pennsylvania constitution departed from this general wisdom. 
While they still worked under the assumption that representation was necessary and that a 
purely democratic government would be inoperable, they afforded a greater degree of 
power to the people than most Americans were willing to concede. They did this by 
rejecting prevailing notions about the balance of power and making the legislature the 
preeminent part of the state government. Rather than distributing power in ways that 
                                                      
42 Edmund S. Morgan’s Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1988) remains perhaps the definitive account of the concept’s development, 
although Morgan contends that the idea mostly remained bound to the realm of theory, providing 
intellectual justification for political norms which often constrained the agency and power of the people. 
Morgan’s understanding of the concept aligns with its exposition by the Pennsylvania constitution’s critics. 
However, it fails to account for the more direct understanding of the idea propounded by the constitution’s 
supporters. Christian G. Fritz’s assessment of the idea in American Sovereigns: The People and America’s 
Constitutional Tradition before the Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2007) aligns more closely with 
the concept’s elaboration by the Pennsylvania Constitutionalists. Also see, Horst Dippel, “The Changing 
Idea of Popular Sovereignty in Early American Constitutionalism: Breaking Away from European 
Patterns,” Journal of the Early Republic 16, no.1 (Spring, 1996), 21-45. 
43 Thad W. Tate, “The Social Contract in America, 1774-1787: Revolutionary Theory as a Conservative 
Instrument,” William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 3 (July, 1965), 375-91. 
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checked the influence of the people over government and appealing to an ideal of 
deferential politics, as the authors of most of the other state constitutions did, the 
Pennsylvania framers created a structure which gave authority to the agents of the people 
and made them directly responsible to their constituents in ways that had not previously 
been realized.44 Political power in Pennsylvania was a stream flowing from a spigot 
which the people could turn at any moment.  
This effort to instantiate directly the authority of the people within the structures 
of government prompted staunch criticism. Supporters of the proprietorship objected to 
the constitution’s displacement of the governmental structure that had existed throughout 
Pennsylvania’s colonial history. Their concerns about the content of the constitution were 
compounded by their objections to the manner in which it was adopted—the Assembly 
that had produced the document was an extralegal body unaccountable to the people. The 
constitution’s opponents argued that the nature of the frame of government’s creation 
rendered it illegitimate. The Assembly had operated in an extralegal manner to establish a 
system which, while democratic in its proposals, had not actually been subject to popular 
approval. The critics of the constitution emphasized the apparent hypocrisy inherent to 
this method of establishing a government (although it is worth noting that the other state 
constitutions were adopted in extralegal manners and were not subject to direct popular 
approval).45  
                                                      
44 For an overview of deference’s place in early American politics, see Richard Beeman, “Deference, 
Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 49, no. 3 (July, 1992), 401-30. 
45 Jack Rakove, “Constitutionalism: The Happiest Revolutionary Script,” in eds., Keith Michael Baker and 
Dan Edelstein, Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015), 114-16. 
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Critics also objected to convention delegates’ common background and apparent 
ignorance of political affairs. One observer referred to the delegates as a group of “plain 
countrymen,”; another bluntly dismissed them as “numsculs.” Even Thomas Smith, a 
delegate to the convention, complained that “not a sixth part of us ever read a word,” 
concerning government.46 Opponents of the constitution seized upon what they regarded 
as its authors’ unrefined backgrounds and ignorance of political affairs. The 
constitution’s critics believed that the members of the convention had violated the 
established norms of political deference, rising above their allotted station and revealing 
their inability to create a government worthy of preservation. 
The state constitution’s apparent radicalism prompted criticism from moderate 
Whigs, including some, such as Benjamin Rush, Christopher Marshall, and Thomas 
McKean, who had been active proponents of Independence and open critics of the 
proprietary government. They recoiled at the domination of politics by a “mobocracy,” 
viewing the constitution’s provisions for popular rule as the extreme product of 
Pennsylvania’s most radical acolytes of popular liberty. John Adams voiced a similar 
opinion, exclaiming “Good God!” on his first reading of the constitution and observing 
that the people of Pennsylvania would soon “be glad to petition the crown of Britain for 
reconciliation” to escape “the tyranny of their Constitution.”47 Adams’ criticism of the 
state constitution is unsurprising, considering his staunch advocacy of the separation of 
powers and bicameralism in “Thoughts on Government,” which Adams wrote in response 
                                                      
46 Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, 131. 
47 David Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961), 177-
178. 
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to Thomas Paine’s argument in Common Sense that the ideal government was one 
comprised of a single-chamber legislature, an elected judiciary bound by a single term, 
and a weak executive--a vision reflected in the state constitution.48 While Adams argued 
that legislatures should be “in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large,” he 
contended that unicameral legislatures were dangerous because they possessed no 
internal checks, and he further maintained that the exercise of executive and judicial 
powers by the legislature was an essential threat to the maintenance of a balance of 
powers between the three branches of government.49  
The broader debate that emerged in Pennsylvania mirrored the disagreement 
between Paine and Adams. It was a contest which pitted a distinct vision of direct 
government by the people against a more prevalent conception of deferential government, 
in which the people were acknowledged as the source of political authority but their 
ability to exercise that power was constrained by a carefully maintained institutional 
equilibrium. While much of the debate consisted of wrangling over specific provisions of 
the constitution, the contest essentially revolved around this fundamental difference in 
outlook. Further, these conflicting visions of political society and constitutional order 
intersected with the partisans’ differing understandings of the meaning of the American 
Revolution. These differences framed the contours of political discourse in Pennsylvania 
throughout the waging of the War of Independence. They attest to the centrality of 
constitutional ideology to political discourse during the Revolutionary period. As the next 
                                                      
48  Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule 
during the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), 22-32; Hawke, In 
the Midst of a Revolution, 183. 
49 Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” in ed. Charles Francis Adams, The Works of John Adams, vol IV 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1856), 132-3. 
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chapter demonstrates, the constitution’s adoption and implementation provided the 
occasion for these distinct visions to be articulated. The newspaper debate that ensued in 
the wake of the constitution’s publication provided a forum for these understandings to 
be expressed at length. 
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Chapter Two: Debating the Constitution in the Press, 1776-1778 
All government supposes power, and power can exist only by delegation. Why 
then should the people by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, in so many cases, 
refuse to part with their power when it is given wholly to their servants who are 
bound by a thousand ties to employ it only for their benefit, and who must return 
it to them every year? The people in this case resemble a man who bequeaths his 
estate to himself, and afterwards appoints himself his own executor.50 
                               --“K,” Pennsylvania Packet, September 24, 1776 
 
In 1811, Alexander Graydon published a memoir detailing his experiences living 
in Pennsylvania over the course of the previous six decades. In addition to recounting a 
personal narrative, Graydon addressed the political trends the state had experienced 
during that period. Graydon articulated a vision of popular government in alignment with 
that of the authors of the state constitution of 1776. The “source of power,” he wrote, 
“has been diligently explored and discovered too…and universal suffrage, with the right 
to pull down and build up again, thence recognized as fundamental.” He noted that this 
discovery had completely upended prevailing notions about the balance of power; it had 
the potential to “puzzle the learned advocates for strong executives, and independent 
judiciaries, and in the end, perhaps, turn all their well-spun theories into lumber, little 
better than nonsense.”51 
Graydon’s perception of political trends in Pennsylvania aligned closely with the 
realities of the state during the American Revolution. The conception of popular 
sovereignty as a precept whose realization had the power to render “strong executives, 
                                                      
50 Pennsylvania Packet, September 24, 1776. 
51 Alexander Graydon, Memoirs of a Life Chiefly Passed in Pennsylvania within the Last Sixty Years 
(Harrisburg, PA: John Wyeth, 1811), 305-306. 
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and independent judiciaries,” unnecessary was central to the way that the supporters of 
the state constitution presented its Frame of Government. Principally articulating their 
vision through a series of newspaper essays, these defenders of the constitution argued 
that the authority of the people, which they viewed as essential to the Revolution, 
necessitated a rejection of prevailing notions about the dispersion of political power. 
Graydon was, further, correct in recalling that this conception of popular sovereignty 
perplexed and discomfited those who believed that “strong executives and independent 
judiciaries” were indispensable to balanced government.52 
Graydon was incorrect, however, in presenting this development as an 
uncontested triumph for the Constitutionalists’ direct reading of popular sovereignty. 
Those who opposed the constitution assailed the notion that the power of the people 
could be reconciled with a government which did not establish a clearly balanced 
dispensation of authority among the branches of government. They argued that the 
constitution’s establishment of a unicameral legislature occupying a place of preeminence 
in the state government provided the basis for the government’s degeneration into an 
arbitrary regime.53 
 Graydon’s account provides a useful overview of the basic fault lines that 
separated the constitution’s supporters and opponents. Their visions of constitutional 
order, premised on conflicting visions of government and divergent notions about the 
purpose of the American Revolution and its proper direction, were presented in the 
                                                      
52 Ibid. 
53 Wood, Creation, 441-442. 
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newspaper essays written in the aftermath of the constitution’s adoption. These essays 
provide a window into understanding the extent and nature of the ideological divisions 
between the two factions in the constitutional debate.  
The disagreement on issues of constitutional structure and the dispersion of power 
that emerged in the aftermath of the constitutional convention persisted throughout 1776. 
The suitability of legislative preeminence and the limits of republican government were 
central themes in Pennsylvania discourse. The public sphere provided a forum for the 
constitution’s supporters and opponents to make their case through a variety of 
arguments.54  
While evidence of these issues’ hold on public consideration can be found in 
public documents, their place in political debate is most apparent in a number of 
newspaper essays written in 1776. Supporters of the constitution championed its 
facilitation of popular rule through the establishment of an annually elected and 
remarkably powerful Assembly. In their eyes, the constitution’s success at realizing, to an 
unprecedented degree, the principle of popular sovereignty meant that revision or 
abandonment of the document were not only unnecessary measures, but efforts to 
undermine the cause of popular government, which they equated with the cause of 
Independence. Opponents of the constitution argued that the framers of the constitution 
had gone entirely too far in their efforts to realize the doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
                                                      
54 For an overview of the literature on the early American public sphere, see John L. Brooke, “Consent, 
Civil Society, and the Public Sphere in the Age of the Revolution,” in eds., Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. 
Robertson, and David Waldstreicher Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the 
Early American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
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They recognized the people as sovereign but believed that their power needed to be 
diffused across multiple branches of government and thereby restrained. They saw their 
proposals to either reform or replace the constitution as sound and moderate efforts to 
ensure governmental stability and avoid disastrous internal calamity in the midst of an 
uncertain war with Great Britain. 
These positions framed the contours of the public debates over the constitution that 
took place in 1776 and 1777. Although not every partisan of the constitution believed that 
the document was faultless, and not every critic of the constitution argued that the Frame 
of Government was irredeemably flawed, disagreement on governmental structure was 
the common thread that bound together the majority of the newspaper essays on the 
constitution written during this period. Further, partisans of both positions argued that 
their respective stances on the state constitution--and, by extension, their conflicting 
visions of governmental order--were bound up with the cause of successfully prosecuting 
the War for Independence and securing the principles of the American Revolution. 
I. Governmental Structure and the Role of the People 
 
 The constitution’s establishment of a unicameral legislature was a source of 
enormous controversy within newspaper debates over the constitution. Supporters of the 
constitution argued that a unicameral legislature was the best means of directly securing 
the liberties of the people because it encapsulated the interests of the entire political 
community within a single body. They further argued that it militated against the 
emergence of “aristocratic” interests, which they contended had historically dominated 
within upper legislative houses. Critics turned upside down the notion that a second 
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legislative branch was necessary to provide legislative wisdom and serve as a check on 
the lower house, noting upper houses’ traditional role as a vehicle for distinguished 
members of society to exercise their influence over political affairs. The elite-centric 
nature of upper houses was, they contended, a threat and not an asset. 
Further debate centered around the legislature’s relationship to the other two 
branches of government. The powers granted the legislature under the constitution 
effectively made it the preeminent part of the state government. Supporters of the Frame 
of Government either argued that the constitution provided enough alternative checks on 
legislative power (through means such as annual elections or the delaying of legislative 
enactment until the opening of the following year’s legislative session) to constrain it, or 
that the legislature’s role as the representative of the people meant that it should wield a 
preponderance of the distribution of power. 
“K,” one of the first authors to comment on the constitution, invoked the 
republican notion that the “weakness and depravity of human nature” made “proper 
restraints” on both liberty and power necessary. They conceded that unicameral 
legislatures would be ideal “If men were wise and virtuous as angels,” but noted that 
human nature had made compound legislatures a staple of free governments. The 
tendency of “liberty to run into licentiousness,” made restraints on legislative power a 
necessity, and “K” argued that an upper house of the legislature would ensure that the 
Assembly remained within the bounds of power prescribed by human errancy.55 
                                                      
55 Pennsylvania Packet, September 24, 1776. 
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“Demophilus” acknowledged such arguments on behalf of an upper house but 
argued that Pennsylvania’s peculiar social composition made such an institution 
impractical. While the essayist recognized the “wisdom of the most learned and 
experienced members of the state,” he argued that Pennsylvania did not boast a large 
enough class of distinguished individuals to assemble an upper chamber of the 
legislature. Pennsylvanians were, he argued, “farmers, men of moderate education, 
possessed of common sense,” but lacking much background in “the history laws or 
politics, even of their own, not to mention other states.” Demophilus thought “The best 
assembly of farmers merchants, and mechanics that could be picked out of the united 
states, would hardly be equal to the task of framing one regular digest.” Their natural 
incapacity for government, would, however, be alleviated by the nature of a unicameral 
assembly; “Demophilus,” argued that single-chamber legislatures were more conducive 
to consideration of “what is RIGHT’ than of abstract questions of political philosophy. 
Further, the essayist ultimately concluded that there were so few individuals in 
Pennsylvania qualified to serve as members of an upper chamber that creating such an 
institution would ensconce an aristocracy within the state government and render the 
common citizens of the state incapable of promoting their own interests against those of 
their superiors.56 
“Camillus” took the notion of popular control over the legislature to even greater 
lengths, rejecting the suggestion that any other branch of government could exercise a 
negative over actions taken by the Assembly. Arguing that “The more simple, and the 
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more immediately dependant the authority is on the people, the better; because it must be 
allowed, that they themselves are the best guardians of their own liberties.” The 
implication of this popular possession of political authority was that the legislature 
needed to be the preeminent branch. It channeled the will of the people and therefore 
could not delegate a negative over its authority to another body. This meant that only the 
people could legitimately exercise a check against the power of the legislature.57 
An article entitled “Remarks on the Resolves published against the Plan of 
Government, by a gentleman of neither party,” argued that the constitution had 
maintained elements of a balance of power while abandoning those aspects that offended 
the sensibilities of Pennsylvanians. Despite the author’s professed detachment from the 
emerging partisan divide engulfing the state, he offered a number of arguments on behalf 
of the constitution. The essayist found that the constitution had in fact established an 
independent judiciary through its provisions for septennial terms of office and fixed 
salaries for judges. The author argued that the executive’s presumed “dependance” on the 
legislature was “mostly imaginary, and where it is real, it is but a continuance of our 
former practice, which so many esteem and admire.” The essayist contended that 
Republicans’ efforts to establish a balanced government had led them to propose a 
recreation of an English-style mixed regime that was inconsistent with the social 
composition of Pennsylvania. Republicans were “evidently exalting the English plan of 
King, Lords, and Commons, in the ideas of a people possessed of different ranks suitable 
thereto…but where are our Nobles? Or who dreams of a King of Pennsylvania?” 
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Pennsylvania society was, the author believed, far too egalitarian for such a system to 
function properly. A classical governmental order, in which different elements of the 
government corresponded with distinct societal interests, could not survive in a society as 
broadly egalitarian as Pennsylvania.58 
The author’s characterization of Republicans as proponents of a mixed regime 
was rhetorically powerful but inaccurate. Contrary to the essayist’s contentions, 
Republicans were not supportive of a classical-style order in which the interests of the 
one, the few, and the many were vested in separate branches and set in counterpoise to 
one another. Rather, the ardency with which they promoted a balance of power resulted 
from a desire for a balanced government controlled by the people but subject to a series 
of institutional constraints on their power. Despite their opponents’ characterization of 
them as reactionary stalwarts, Republicans were proposing balanced government—at the 
time a revolutionary concept—not the mixed regime of classical politics. 
The author further contended that the legislature could assume powers beyond the 
domain of lawmaking without becoming tyrannical, noting that the state Assembly had 
created a Committee of Safety comprised of its own members the previous winter. 
Beyond simply being a refutation of established assumptions about the delineation of 
powers among branches of government, this notion was a justification for extralegal 
government under the auspices of promoting the common safety and general welfare of 
the state. The author seemed to believe that the exigencies facing the state sanctioned a 
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broad degree of legislative discretion to take any action necessary to promote the state’s 
safety.59 
“One of the People” argued that those intent on establishing an upper house 
wanted such an institution because of its “lordly powers to direct and controul the 
Commons.” The author rejected the Republican assertion that the “fatal influence of 
hasty, incorrect, passionate and prejudiced determinations” would prevail should a lower 
house “consisting chiefly of farmers and mechanics,” be established and criticized the 
notion that the “other House will be famed for wise, prudent, just and well judged 
counsels.” The essayist appealed to English history as an example of the merits of a lower 
house, observing that the House of Commons was the principal instrument within the 
English government for the advancement of liberty: “They were brave, prudent, and 
eloquent, they were the guardians of liberty, the glory of Britain and an honor to 
mankind.” The House of Lords, by contrast, had only served as a roadblock to the work 
of the House of Commons on behalf of liberty. 
The essayist further suggested that an upper house would inevitably become as 
corrupt and aristocratic as he believed the House of Lords was. The author suggested that 
the “sons of wisdom” who would occupy seats in an upper chamber would eventually 
refuse to “submit to yearly elections by the ignorant vulgar,” pushing for longer terms of 
office and eventually demanding “places and pensions to support their dignity.” “One of 
the People” argued that the upper house would be able to effectively deploy assumptions 
about the “passion and prejudice” of the lower chamber to prevent the lower house from 
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checking its members’ efforts to aggrandize power and influence. The result would be 
that “every leader must have a place of honor, or profit, or an annuity for life for 
betraying the state,” a development which had occurred within the House of Lords and 
could easily be simulated in America, as “we know that what has happened in Britain 
may happen in America.” “One of the People” cited English historical example in 
rebuttal to the theoretical arguments about the necessity of an upper house raised by 
opponents of the constitution.60 
“The Considerate Freeman” submitted that the equal and representative nature of 
the legislature was sufficient insurance against the possibility of its members behaving 
tyrannically. The author saw the legislature as an embodiment of the ideal of actual 
representation:  
it consists of a body of men, chosen in every part of the State by the free voice of 
the people for whom they are to legislate, and proportioned on the true principles 
of representation, so that every man has a voice in delegating the man who is to 
give away his money, or make the laws by which he is to be bound, and no man 
has a greater voice than another…By this means the whole State becomes its own 
council, and every freeman in it is a counsellor, and the negative lies in the whole 
body politic, and not in a few grandees.61 
 
The author contended that the entire citizenry of Pennsylvania was represented by the 
legislature. Rather than representing merely a select segment of the general population, 
the Assembly would represent the interests of every element of the political community. 
Where upper houses could easily “gratify their ambition and thirst for power at the 
expence of the people,” because the nature of an upper chamber placed distance between 
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its members and the people, the Assembly could not become “ambitious and tyrannical” 
without jeopardizing its members own interests, because pursuing such a course would 
require them to “exercise its [the legislature’s] projects on itself.” This representative 
character, “A Considerate Freeman” contended, would be reinforced by the constitution’s 
provisions for annual elections, term limits, and transparency in the legislature’s 
meetings, which would ensure that the legislature’s members could not acquire an excess 
of power or operate in ways that contradicted the wishes of their constituents.62 
  Constitutionalist arguments in support of the legislature established under the 
Frame of Government were greeted with swift and robust resistance by Republicans. 
Republicans’ criticisms of the constitution’s unicameral and preeminent legislature 
centered primarily around the notions that unicameral legislatures gave too much direct 
power to the people without any internal check and that a preeminent legislature upset the 
separation of powers necessary to prevent a single governing body from acquiring an 
excess of power.  
 “Scipio,” attributed the success of the constitutions written in neighboring states 
to their removal solely of the monarchical elements of their constitutions and their 
retention of upper legislative houses and governorships. The essayist argued that a people 
capable of attaining freedom and happiness under a unicameral legislature “might be 
equally free and happy without any government,” arguing that “Both situations suppose 
equal degrees of virtue in a people.” The virtue of the people alone was insufficient to 
secure liberty; it could only be acquired through a balanced government. “Scipio” 
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rejected the republican idea that civic virtue was the bulwark of liberty, instead 
embracing the notion that governmental structures intended to restrain the dangerous 
impulses of the masses were the best means of achieving it.63 
 “Samuel Howell” expressed anticonstitutionalists’ support for a “mixed and 
tempered legislature.” Unlike most of the constitution’s critics, the author suggested that 
the constitution was conducive to economic division. He envisioned a perpetual contest 
between the wealthy and the impoverished, averring Republicans’ desire for “a 
government that shall not suffer the rich and poor alternately to be the prey of each 
other.” He contended that “prejudices and passions of the WHOLE community” had been 
“let loose upon every man’s property, liberty, and life” through the legislature, the courts, 
and the Council of Censors. The fundamental problem, “Howell” contended, was that the 
people had “UNDONE themselves by a hasty and ill-judged exercise of their OWN 
power.” By concentrating the entire power of the political community within a single 
venue (the legislature), the people had made themselves functionally supreme. This 
empowered the people as a collective, but endangered their individual lives, liberty, and 
property by unleashing the collective from the restraints embedded within a more 
conventionally balanced system.64 
 “One of the People” expressed profound uneasiness with the idea of a preeminent 
legislature. Commenting on the legislature’s power to determine terms of office, the 
author argued that “the monster prerogative” threatened the rights of citizens by 
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subjecting them to the oversight of “mere arbitrary edict[s]” instead of carefully 
sanctioned protocol for governance. The author rejoiced that the constitution had reserved 
the power of amendment to the Council of Censors, arguing that such a power in the 
hands of the Assembly would make them “as absolute masters of the lives and fortunes of 
their constituents in Pennsylvania” as Parliament had been over British subjects.65 
 “Hampden” stressed the resemblance between the broad scope of powers granted 
the Assembly by the constitution and the supremacy asserted by Parliament during the 
Imperial Crisis: “Our Assembly is an omnipotent body. Like the British Parliament they 
have a right to bind us in all cases whatever.—They are unlimited in the extent and 
exercise of their power.” This absolute power was magnified by the absence of any 
mechanisms through which the people could militate against the legislature’s authority; 
the people had “no Legislative Council, or Governor to check their violence.” 
“Hampden” contended that a legislature wielding unrestrained power was potentially just 
as dangerous to the fundamental rights of the governed as an absolute monarch: “Where 
is the man that would give up the absolute disposal of his property, liberty, or life for 
seven years, or even for one year, to any one man in the world?...the freemen of 
Pennsylvania have suffered one body of men to usurp an absolute power over their 
property, liberty, and lives for one year by their laws; and for seven years by their 
constitution.” Although Hampden contended that the scope of the legislature’s authority 
was a product of its disregard for the constitution, the extent of the Assembly’s powers 
was outlined in the constitution and, even if it acted in ways contradictory of the Frame 
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of Government, the source of Hampden’s objection seemed to be the author’s concern 
that the other branches possessed far too little power to check the legislature. 
A gathering of critics of the constitution in the Philadelphia state-yard on October 
22 issued a series of criticisms of the constitution, including their objections to its clauses 
pertaining to the legislature. They noted the constitution’s differences from “those lately 
formed,” especially paying attention to its legislative clauses. They objected to the 
legislature’s unicameral nature and to the dependence of the judicial and executive 
branches upon the Assembly. They specifically pointed to the legislature’s power of 
removal over judges and its ability to determine the membership of the Supreme 
Executive Council and alter the members’ salaries at will. The Republican critics upheld 
the separation of powers, “The several powers, being separated and distributed into 
different hands, for checks one upon another,” as “the only effectual mode ever invented 
by men to promote their freedom and prosperity.” They argued that the notion of the new 
state government as a balanced one was utterly false and that “in truth the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers may be said to be united in one body, the Assembly.”66 
Critics also objected to the notion that the people of Pennsylvania could be 
expected to render the level of civic engagement necessary to effectively govern 
themselves. “Andrew Marvell” rejected the notion that a check on legislative power 
could be placed “in the hands of the people at large” instead of within a legislative 
council. Where “Demophilus” had argued that the absence of a large number of 
distinguished citizens necessitated a unicameral legislature consisting only of a lower 
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house, “Andrew Marvell” argued that it made a functioning lower house an impossibility. 
“Marvell” noted that a purely popular Assembly would require “all men to possess equal 
understanding, knowledge, and leisure,” a mandate that could not be upheld in reality. It 
would further require the people to forgo their personal livelihoods, forcing “the 
husbandman” to “neglect his farm,” “the merchant” to “forsake his compting-house,” and 
“the tradesman shut up his shop to examine the acts of every session of Assembly.” 
Moreover, the distance separating towns and villages made it highly impractical for the 
residents of counties to gather after every legislative session “to debate and vote in a 
tumultuary manner upon their laws, and afterwards instruct their members to confirm or 
reject them.” “Marvell” believed that both the hierarchy of “understanding, knowledge, 
and leisure” and the realities of agricultural and commercial activities made a directly 
representative legislature prohibitively difficult to achieve.67 
“Ludlow” criticized the constitution’s egalitarian premises, arguing that they were 
“wholly repugnant to the principles of action in man” and certain “to check the progress 
of genius and virtue in human nature.” The constitution had ignored the pervasive 
inequalities in “property, wisdom and virtue among the inhabitants of the state,” 
mistakenly presupposing “perfect equality” in those traits. This failure to properly 
grapple with human nature had produced an inability to represent the distinctions 
between legislative, executive, and judicial powers. “Ludlow” contended that these 
functions had been “jumbled together in a most unsystematic manner.” These failings 
combined to produce a constitution that completely elided both social and economic 
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differences and the distinctions in governmental power that republican theorists had 
asserted were essential to a balanced government. The attempt to produce an equal and 
representative government through the constitution had instead resulted in the inverse: a 
government that failed to represent both social reality and the realities of governance.68 
Benjamin Rush echoed these critiques in a pamphlet published in 1777. Sounding 
nearly identical to “Ludlow” (and apparently revealing either the influence of that author 
or indicating that Rush himself had written that essay), Rush contended that the 
constitution “supposes perfect equality, and an equal distribution of property, wisdom, 
and virtue, among the inhabitants of the state.” Rather than vesting legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers in separate and distinct branches, Rush contended that the 
constitution had them “jumbled together in a most unsystematic manner.”69  
Rush criticized the constitution for effectively granting the legislature carte 
blanche to operate as it wished. The constitution, he contended, had placed the “supreme, 
absolute, and uncontrouled power of the whole state” in “the hands of one body of men.” 
Rush argued that this grant of power to a single instrument of government violated the 
separation of powers. He quoted a passage from the Viscount Bolingbroke in which the 
English noble posited that “simple governments,” which granted the “whole supreme 
power” solely in the hands of a single individual or group, as governments of “arbitrary 
will.”70   
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Expounding on this theme, Rush argued that the constitution’s supporters had confused 
simplicity of principles— “perfect security for property; liberty and life” with simplicity 
of practice. He noted that the essential aims of government were simple, but that their 
realization required “extensive combinations” of power. Emphasizing the importance of 
an elaborate diffusion of power, Rush contended that simple governments tended towards 
tyranny because they failed to properly disperse power.71  
Rush distinguished between the principles and forms of government, describing 
principles as “simple” and forms as “difficult and complicated.” Illustrating the 
difference between principles and practice, he pointed to an example from the scientific 
realm: “Who understood the principles of mechanics and optics better than Sir Isaac 
Newton? and yet Sir Isaac could not for his life have made a watch or a microscope.” 
Rush highlighted the discrepancy between an understanding of the principles of 
government and an understanding of those principles’ implications for governmental 
structure. He identified John Locke as the “oracle” with regard to principles of 
government and James Harrington and the Baron de Montesquieu as oracles with regard 
to forms of government. Rush argued that the principles of securing life, liberty, and 
property required a level of governmental sophistication that could only be achieved 
through the extensive separation of powers advocated by Harrington and Montesquieu.72 
Rush questioned the representative character of the state Assembly. Drawing on 
the republican notion that the representation of property was foundational to a truly 
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representative government, Rush contended that the absence of a property qualification to 
vote, combined with the eligibility of all electors to serve in the Assembly, made it 
possible for the legislature to have no interest in representing the property-holding 
citizens of the state. He envisioned a scenario in which the legislature did not possess “a 
single foot of property in the State, and who can give no other evidence of a common 
interest in, or attachment to, the community than having paid ‘public taxes,’ which may 
mean poor-taxes.” Rush argued that the broad scope of the electorate, coupled with the 
absence of any substantive qualifications for officeholding, made it possible for those 
who did not possess the levels of property generally thought necessary for political 
participation to acquire the reins of power and effectively disenfranchise the property-
holding class.73 
Rush simultaneously argued on behalf of basic political equality and organic 
social inequality. Responding to the idea that “there is but one rank of men in America,” 
Rush conceded that “there should be only one representation of them in a government.” 
He further stated his opposition to “artificial distinctions of men into noblemen and 
commoners.” However, he argued that, despite the absence of a formal aristocracy, a 
more organic social hierarchy had arisen in America. “Superior degrees of industry and 
capacity, and above all, commerce” had produced “inequality of property,” creating 
“natural distinctions of rank in Pennsylvania, as certain and general as the artificial 
distinctions of men in Europe.” Rush argued that these social distinctions predicated on 
differences of wealth needed to be represented in a bicameral legislature. Placing the 
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middling and poor in the same legislative chamber as the men of “over-grown property” 
would merely enable those wealthy members to bribe and control the less wealthy 
members. In his concern with maintaining a representation of property within the 
legislature and with preventing the natural aristocracy from using influence and bribes to 
control their social and economic inferiors, Rush was typically republican.74 
Further objecting to the arguments fielded by the constitution’s supporters on 
behalf of the document, Rush contended that a traditional separation of powers did not 
pave the road for an aristocracy or monarchy to emerge. Contesting the notion that a 
“legislative council or governor lays the foundation for aristocratical and monarchical 
power in a community,” Rush argued that the popular sanction underpinning upper 
houses and governorships would prevent them from becoming tyrannical. Because those 
institutions would be popularly elected, they would represent the will of the people. 
There was nothing inherently aristocratic about an upper chamber or monarchical about a 
governor. He questioned whether “the same fountain of pure water should send forth, at 
the same time, wholesome and deadly streams?” and noted that, in a bicameral system, 
the “Council and Assembly” were “both formed alike from the common breath of the 
people.” Rush went to great lengths to distinguish between balanced government, which 
he saw as compatible with the authority of the people, and a mixed regime grounded in a 
classical understanding of society.75  
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Rush acknowledged popular sovereignty, but his attitude towards its realization 
differed greatly from his opponents’ stance. Rush recognized that power was derived 
from the people but denied that it should be “seated in the people.” He emphasized the 
necessity of a delegation of authority away from the “people at large,” because making 
them “judges of laws, or checks for Assemblies” was an effort that relied on the 
“supposition that mankind is all alike wise, and just, and have equal leisure.” According 
to Rush, the people could not simultaneously delegate power while reserving the right to 
exercise it themselves:  
What man ever made himself his own attorney? And yet this would not be more 
absurd than for the people at large to pretend to give up their power to a set of 
rulers, and afterwards reserve the right of making and judging of all their laws 
themselves. Such a government is a Monster in nature. It contains as many 
Governors, Assemblymen, Judges and Magistrates as there are freemen in the 
State, all exercising the same powers and at the same time.76 
 
Rush believed that granting the people an excess of oversight and power over their 
representatives was certain to result in disorder. Such a concession failed to recognize the 
distinction between the source of power (the people) and their agents, who alone 
possessed the authority to exercise it. The people did not even need to choose every 
member of a government for it to represent their interests, he argued. Popular sovereignty 
took effect even when one representative of the people chose another in their stead. The 
people ultimately possessed control by acting as “the first link of the sacred chain of the 
power of the State,” but they did not need to control every aspect of that power’s 
employment. Rush thought that the practical realities of governance necessitated a 
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deference of the people towards their representatives that precluded governments of such 
a direct character as the one established by the Pennsylvania framers.77 
Essayists also disagreed about the proper scope and composition of the electorate. 
“Camillus” rejected the notion that political authority should be removed from the hands 
of the people, arguing that “The more simple, and the more immediately dependant the 
authority is on the people, the better,” because the people “themselves are the best 
guardians of their own liberties.” This direct authority of the people extended to its power 
over the legislature, according to “Camillus.” The essayists argued that negatives on 
legislative power should only be exercised by the people and their direct agents and that 
the exercise of such a check by non-elective elements of the government was a violation 
of the sovereignty of the governed. This understanding of popular sovereignty’s 
implications for government aligned closely with the powerful and preeminent legislature 
established under the state constitution.78 
While discussions of the scope of the electorate often took on a theoretical tone, they 
were not devoid of social dimensions. “Spectator,” commenting on the Republican 
meeting at the Pennsylvania Philosophical Society, praised the attendees as “men of 
property, and some of ambition enough to serve all the good people on this side of the 
Blue Mountains; and that was much better than to have been plagued with a 
contradictious mob of your scum of the earth, who of late conceit they have a right to 
meddle with state affairs.” The author noted the conspicuous presence of “leading men” 
among the meeting’s members. The author’s open discussion of the existence of a class 
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of leading figures better suited to rule than their inferiors among the rabble was 
uncharacteristic of Republican rhetoric. Most critics of the constitution criticized the 
ability of the people to directly govern themselves and pointed to the magnetic effect 
institutions like an upper house and governorship would have on those best suited to 
govern. Few expressed the direct hostility towards the masses displayed by “Spectator.” 
However, the authors’ bromide against the masses indicated that at least some opposition 
to the constitution was motivated by a belief in a distinct social hierarchy.79 
II. Establishing Patriot Credentials 
 
 Participants in the press debate also attempted to establish their respective status 
as supporters of the Patriot cause, in the process suggesting that their opponents were in 
fact either opposed to the cause of independence or, nearly as bad, “disaffected” towards 
it.80 They employed a brand of rhetoric laden with appeals to patriotism and bromides 
against the British Empire. Appealing to a sense of mutual honor and fortitude, they 
portrayed themselves as the foot soldiers of liberty and their opponents as its enemies.81 
“Cassius” criticized some of the critics of the constitution for urging Non-
Associators and Loyalists to refuse paying a tax imposed on them as a substitute for 
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military service, arguing that their advocacy for such a refusal was impeding the war 
cause. The essayist characterized the members of the constitutional convention as “Whigs 
and Associators” whose works “testif[ied]” of their commitment to the war. By contrast, 
those who proposed resistance to the tax for those not engaged in military service were 
“Non-Associators.”82 
“Scavola” questioned whether the constitution was capable of commanding 
enough public support to sustain the state through the course of the war with Britain. The 
author predicted that “The next seven years will be loud in their demands upon us for 
blood and treasure. They will require uncommon vigor and union among us…” 
“Scavola” expressed skepticism as to whether the constitution was capable of producing 
such a sense of unanimity and making the people “united and rendered one mass of 
people.” Attempting to disentangle support from the Pennsylvania war effort with assent 
to the constitution, “Scavola” proposed replacing the constitution’s loyalty oath for 
entering public servants with a pledge to disavow allegiance to George III and uphold the 
“Freedom and Independence of this state.” Affirming his status as a participant in the 
military effort, “Scavola” noted that he had “borne arms in defence of the independence 
of these States,” and was “willing to seal his attachment to it with his blood.”83 
A gathering of Republicans at the Philadelphia Philosophical Society in 
November expressed their belief that a state of disorder was preferable to the 
establishment of a government they perceived as inimical to the goals of the Revolution. 
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While they recognized the “inconveniences of the want of a regular government, that 
shall collect and exert the strength of the state against our powerful external and artful 
internal enemies,” they believed that such an absence of a vigorous government was 
preferable to the constitution. They argued that the document “destroys the great objects 
of equal liberty and free government, for which alone we consented to draw the sword in 
the present contest with Great Britain.” Although they believed that a government 
capable of superintending the military contest with Britain was essential, they contended 
that the state constitution undermined the objectives of the War for Independence to such 
an extent that it could not be maintained if the struggle was to retain its character as an 
attempt to secure “equal liberty and free government.”84  
“Farmer” criticized the internal discord he saw prevailing within the Whig cause. 
He noted that the supporters of independence were contending both with the power of the 
British Empire and the “political machinations of its [the Revolution’s] internal enemies, 
who are endeavouring at this important crisis to throw everything into confusion, by 
impeding and distracting our civil polity.” The author did not directly implicate the 
constitution’s authors as the Revolution’s “internal enemies,” but expressed criticism of 
the constitution’s disruptions of the established order and seemed to view 
Constitutionalists as a source of acrimony. However, “Farmer” believed that both Whigs 
and Tories were resorting to extreme measures on behalf of their causes: “Where the 
Whigs have prevailed, they have run into extravagant refinements, on republican 
principles; and where the Tories have prevailed, the spirit of monarchy has made large 
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and dangerous strides…” The author believed that neither extreme was “fitted to the 
genius and authority of the people.” “Farmer” ultimately inclined towards the Republican 
camp while employing a rhetoric of moderation and conciliation.85 
“Demophilus” likened those who opposed the state constitution with the initial 
opponents of the Patriot cause during the Imperial Crisis. The author contrasted those 
individuals’ desire to maintain order and stability under British rule, to “submit to some 
abridgement of liberty rather than run the venture of being thrown into a state of anarchy 
and confusion” with their sudden commitment to “overthrowing our civil constitution 
without proposing one single measure for establishing another.” “Demophilus” suggested 
that those individuals had in fact retained their support for Britain and that it was this 
covert loyalism which motivated their opposition to the constitution. By challenging the 
“authority of whole community,” and conspiring to alter the constitution, these 
individuals leaned towards an “immediate separation of themselves from the body of the 
Common-Wealth.” “Demophilus” noted that, surprisingly, “in fact some of the are open 
enough to acknowledge the consequence” of this  separation taunted their fellow 
Pennsylvanians with prospect of occupation by the British, “tell[ing] us plainly as they 
think will bear, that Lord Howe is expected to pay us a visit in Philadelphia.” In 
Demophilus’s account, there was only a short distance between attempting to change the 
constitution and supporting the British war effort.86 
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“Union” believed that both the constitution’s supporters and opponents were 
genuinely invested in the success of the War of Independence but argued that revising the 
constitution was an essential precondition for winning the conflict. The author 
characterized the constitution’s authors as “worthy men and warmly attached to the 
American cause,” who “had nothing in view but the liberty and happiness of 
Pennsylvania.”87 However, “Union” believed that the constitution’s authors had failed to 
establish a government capable of securing liberty and ensuring happiness. The essayist 
argued that an immediate reshaping of the constitution was necessary. In response to 
those who argued that the “immediate establishment of a regular government” was 
imperative, “Union” questioned: “Is there anything half the consequence in the present 
struggle as a good constitution?” Expanding on that question, the author argued that the 
source and objective of the military conflict was the desire for “a good government.”88  
“Union” argued that abandoning the constitution was the state’s best hope of 
animating the energies of Pennsylvania’s soldiers: “And what but a good government will 
ever call forth the wisdom—the strength and the virtue of Pennsylvania, so as to give 
them their proper weight in the great scale of the United States?” “Union” characterized a 
good government as “a soldier’s legal title to liberty,” noting that “The prospect of 
ending his days under a happy constitution is the sweetest supporter a soldier can have 
under the hardships of a campaign.” This incentive made amending the constitution an 
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ideal way to “call forth the flower of our State, and fill our camp with men, who will 
possess with the courage of soldiers, the disinterested virtues of citizens and patriots.”89  
“Hampden” similarly contended that the demands of wartime and the presence of 
“Howe at our gates” were not sufficiently compelling reasons to maintain the 
constitution. The essayist queried, “Did we say a ‘bad government was better than none’ 
when we threw off the royal and proprietary governments of Great-Britain? Did we not 
feel ourselves too much cramped by them, to exert our whole strength in the defence of 
our liberties?” While the author recognized the tumultuous circumstances facing 
Pennsylvania, they noted that the other states had framed their constitutions in the midst 
of warfare. Further, they contended that continuing under the state constitution much 
longer would render Pennsylvanians “ever afterwards unfit to assert or relish the sweets 
of liberty, or of a free government.”90 
“Addison” addressed the military campaign of 1776, arguing that Pennsylvanians’ 
valor “reflect[ed] much honour upon the state, but none upon the Constitution.” The 
essayist suggested that the constitution had not been the source of the military heroism 
displayed by Pennsylvania’s soldiers: “Did it prompt them to face all the dangers of the 
war, and to endure all the inclemencies of the season? Did it lead them against the enemy 
at Princeton? Did it support them under the amazing fatigues, which preceded and 
followed the action at that place?” “Addison” believed that Pennsylvanians had 
demonstrated tremendous courage, but that it had not been motivated by any desire to 
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sustain the constitution. The essayist suggested that the loyalty oath established by the 
constitution was detrimental to the Patriot cause. Rather than being aimed at “tories, or 
persons disaffected to the American cause,” the oath was in reality intended to exclude 
those within the Patriot camp “who should disapprove of the constitution,” a number 
which included “a majority of the Whigs in the state.” While “Addison” believed that 
abandoning the constitution in the middle of the conflict with Britain would result in 
“confusion and anarchy,” the author contended that it was nonetheless an obstacle to 
winning the War for Independence, not an asset.91 
A circular published in May of 1777 contended that the constitution had 
transformed Pennsylvania from a model Patriot state to an ineffectual participant in the 
struggle for independence. At the outset of the conflict with Britain, “Vigour and union 
prevailed in her Councils, and in her actions. She was considered as a pattern for other 
governments. Her exertions in the general cause were great and important. The enemies 
of liberty beheld her with dread, and its friends with pleasure.” However, the constitution 
had produced an absence of effective government, evidenced by the Assembly’s 
abandonment of the state the previous winter, an absence of laws “adequate to our 
present very critical situation,” the spread of disaffection with the Revolutionary cause, 
the depreciation of currency, and a shortage of necessities. Although the circular 
acknowledged the presence of “Whigs on both sides of this dispute about the 
Constitution,” it argued that the constitution was the source of Pennsylvania’s failure to 
effectively contribute to the war effort. While the piece recognized the sincere Whiggism 
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of the Constitutionalists, it suggested that their faith in the constitution as an embodiment 
of Revolutionary principles had been contradicted by its failure to effectively unify the 
state’s partisans of the Patriot cause.92 
Benjamin Rush voiced a similar opinion of the constitution’s authors, noting their 
sincere commitment to the Patriot cause but describing them as completely incapable of 
creating an effective government. He identified the members of the constitutional 
convention as “true Whigs” who “aimed sincerely at forming a free and happy 
government” but remarked that “if [Robert] Filmar (sic) and [Thomas] Hobbes had sat 
among them, they could not formed a government more destructive of human happiness.” 
Neither, he believed could “Lord North or General Howe” have created a government 
“more destructive of union and vigour, in our public affairs.” Rush avoided the common 
tendency to characterize the Constitutionalists as Loyalists but concurred with fellow 
Republicans in noting that the constitution was scarcely more favorable to the interests of 
Pennsylvania than British rule had been.93 
An author writing in late 1778 contended that the precedent of the Patriot effort to 
secure independence should serve as an indication of the lengths to which Pennsylvanians 
should resort in replacing the constitution. Noting that Pennsylvanians’ “support of the 
present revolution” had been animated by “indignation” against “an attempt made upon 
your liberties by the people of Great Britain,” the author questioned what measures might 
be necessary to replace a “constitution inconsistent with the principles of liberty.” The 
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essayist questioned the commitment of Constitutionalists to the Patriot cause, noting the 
presence of “persons who have assumed the title of Whigs; and, by bawling against 
Tories, have imposed themselves upon us as sound patriots.” In contrast to these pretend 
Patriots, Republicans were “men who have spiritedly, from the beginning, opposed the 
tyranny of Great Britain.” The author identified “the purpose of the revolution” as 
“establish[ing] and secur[ing] the liberties of America” and suggested that the 
constitution had fundamentally betrayed those objectives.94 
The prospect of winning the war also influenced direct political appeals. When six 
representatives in the state Assembly from Bedford County refused to take their seats in 
the legislature out of opposition to the constitution, some of their constituents appealed to 
the pressing need to direct all the state’s energies towards the military conflict. They 
argued that the prosecution of the war should take precedent over internal debates about 
the constitution and rather poetically raised the charge to combat: “Come, brave boys, let 
us hasten to the field, and contend for our liberties with the sword, and lay aside all 
fruitless disputes, lest a yoke be forced upon our necks, bigger than our father’s loins.”95 
Although the concurrent claims to Patriot legitimacy and accusations of Toryism 
made by Constitutionalists and Republicans rarely explicitly addressed the content of the 
constitution, they were nonetheless steeped in clashing understandings of its effect on the 
conduct of the war in Pennsylvania. The constitution’s supporters contended that it had 
successfully guided the state through the travails of conflict, serving as a source of 
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martial unity. Its critics argued that the state’s soldiers were fighting to overthrow British 
control over the state and that they were not at all motivated by a desire to preserve the 
constitution. The essayists on both sides seemed to make little distinction between the 
Revolution as a political process and the conduct of the war itself—suggesting by 
implication that, because the constitution was either an asset or an obstruction to the 
prosecution of the conflict, it was either an essential part of the Revolutionary struggle or 
an obstacle to its fulfillment. 
III. Continuity vs. Change 
 
 The extent to which the Frame of Government differed from the proprietary 
government in place throughout Pennsylvania’s colonial history was another source of 
contention among those who engaged in newspaper debates over the constitution. Critics 
of the constitution argued that the document’s authors had gone to extreme lengths in 
their efforts to upend the proprietary system and had produced a form of government 
inconsistent with the state’s conventions. While they advocated for a replacement of the 
monarchical and hereditary characteristics of the proprietary system with republican and 
elective ones, they argued that the basic structure of the government already in place 
should have been retained. The wholesale abandonment of the proprietary system 
revealed an inattentiveness to the “prejudices and habits of the people.”96 “Scavola” 
expressed a conviction that the constitution conflicted with the “genius, manners, habits, 
and prejudices of the people of Pennsylvania.”97 The attendees of an anticonstitutionalist 
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gathering in the statehouse yard in Philadelphia summed up this view by noting that the 
constitution “unnecessarily deviates from all resemblance to the former government of 
this state, to which the people have become accustomed” and observing that the people 
only wanted an abolition of the “kingly, parliamentary, and proprietary powers.”98 
A subsequent Republican gathering issued a similar criticism, arguing that the 
constitution’s authors had failed to account for the state’s governing traditions. Urging a 
group of incoming legislators to propose amendments to the constitution, they stressed 
the representatives’ responsibility to account for “influence of ancient habits upon the 
minds of your constituents,” and to thus “oppose unnecessary alterations in the late form 
of government of Pennsylvania.” They contended that the basic structure of the 
proprietary government needed to be retained and that the only “innovations” that were 
necessary were those that “abolish the late regal and proprietary power of the state” and 
“place the whole executive power of the government in the hands of the servants of the 
people.” They wanted the government of Pennsylvania to be cleansed of the vestiges of 
monarchical and proprietary rule and become representative but argued that further 
deviations from colonial tradition were unnecessary. This suggested that they viewed the 
act of constitution-making not as a transformative and decisive abandonment of prior 
precedent, but as an opportunity to retain the basic elements of existing government 
practice while rejecting those which were unrepublican.99 
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“Christophilus Scotus” acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding the 
constitution’s framing had been “extraordinary” and that “extraordinary diseases require 
extraordinary remedies.” Despite this recognition of the extreme situation in which the 
convention’s members had found themselves, however, the essayist expressed 
befuddlement at their departure from the colonial charter. The author questioned “why 
the Convention, in their new frame of government, should have steered so wide of the 
good old charter and constitution of this formerly happy and flourishing province.” While 
the authors of the constitution were justified in considering radical measures, prosperity 
and happiness had prevailed under the proprietorship and “Christophilus Scotus” could 
see no reason why such a beneficial frame of government should be abandoned.100 
“Ludlow” believed that the constitution had failed to properly account for the 
“ancient habits & customs of the people of Pennsylvania.” This was a tremendous error, 
the author contended, because “The suddenness of the late revolution, the attachment of a 
large body of the people to the old Constitution of the state, and the general principles of 
human nature” all made “an attention to ancient forms and habits…a matter of utmost 
importance.” The essayist believed that maintaining governmental continuity was 
essential in a crisis as sweeping as the military struggle with Britain.101  
“A Friend of Mankind” extolled Pennsylvania’s status as a beacon of progress and 
attributed this success to the proprietorship. In addition to pointing out the proprietary 
government’s success in securing persons, property, and liberties, the author argued that 
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it had been essential to Pennsylvania’s rapid development into a haven of law, reason, 
and civilization. Pennsylvania had undergone in under a century an “astonishing progress 
not only in wealth, trade and manufactories, but in the polite arts and sciences.” The 
essayist could find no other example in which “a wilderness as this country was within 
the past century, aided by all the powers of the parent state, had made an equal progress 
with this of Pennsylvania, founded solely on the reason, equity, and mildness of its laws.” 
“A Friend of Mankind” stressed the exceptionalism of Pennsylvania and suggested that 
its societal and governmental distinctness would be eroded through the abandonment of 
the proprietorship.102 
This aspect of the Republican critiques revealed two things. First, it indicated a 
preference for custom and convention—perhaps unsurprising, considering the extent to 
which those principles were generally regarded as foundational to Anglo-American 
constitutionalism. Secondly, and more interestingly, it suggested the notion that 
governmental structures and governmental forms were not interchangeable. Republicans 
argued that a concurrent retention of the proprietary frame of government and 
displacement of “kingly, parliamentary, and proprietary powers,” could be achieved. This 
indicated a notion that governmental structures were not inherently conducive to either 
popular or monarchical rule. This set them apart from Constitutionalists, who believed 
that institutions of government could be conformed precisely to the interests of the people 
and that the failure to create a system of government that replicated directly the interests 
of the people would jeopardize the Revolution. Republicans believed that constitutional 
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innovation was not necessary to secure the Revolution because the Revolution was 
primarily a struggle for local autonomy from British control. For them, it was not an 
effort to establish a government that embodied a direct vision of popular government that 
required a decisive abandonment of previous constitutional precedents. Even in debating 
something as simple as the preservation of established customs of governing, the the 
ideological chasm between Constitutionalists and Republicans was glaring. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 The debate that emerged in the aftermath of the constitution’s adoption 
encompassed a broad range of issues. Through their assertions about the proper 
composition and authority of the legislature, the scope of the electorate (a question which 
entailed consideration of the relationship between the government and the governed), and 
the constitution’s place in the struggle for independence, Constitutionalists and 
Republicans expressed distinct visions of society, government, and the American 
Revolution. Their understandings of the constitution, and consequently of the course of 
the Revolution in Pennsylvania, were shaped by convictions about the nature of politics 
which apparently predated the constitution’s creation. While the constitution provided the 
occasion for these understandings to be expressed, the conflict between the participants’ 
political visions was rooted in fundamentally different conceptions of politics that 
preceded the document’s drafting. These political visions informed the ways in which 
Constitutionalists and Republicans viewed the constitution’s Frame of Government. In 
the domestic conflict within the Patriot movement in Pennsylvania, politics shaped 
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism in turn became intertwined with the ways in which 
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the differing Whig factions viewed the Revolution itself. These developments remained 
essential, if less apparent than they were at the military conflict’s outset, throughout the 
course of the war, and manifested themselves quite visibly during the Council of 
Censors’ deliberations in 1783 and 1784.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Chapter Three: Debates on the Pennsylvania Constitution in the Council of 
Censors, 1783-84 
 
When the Council of Censors convened in 1783, it wielded a broad mandate to 
review the Pennsylvania constitution. It was constitutionally empowered to review and 
strike down enactments by the state legislature, giving it a retroactive negative on the 
Assembly. It was also authorized to propose amendments to the constitution. The latter 
power made the Council’s meetings, held both in late 1783 and the summer of 1784, an 
ideal forum for adjudicating the opposing stances on the document assumed by the 
constitution’s supporters and opponents. Republican critics of the constitution, intent on 
reshaping the constitution to make it more closely resemble conventional notions about 
the division of powers, made a number of proposals to amend the document. 
Constitutionalist supporters of the Frame of Government countered by associating the 
constitution with the spirit and character of the Revolution. Assuming the constitution’s 
alignment with Whig principles, they accused their adversaries of engaging in a 
campaign to overturn the achievements of the Patriot cause.  
These accusations were undoubtedly inspired in part by the expediency of 
accusing the opposition of Loyalism. However, they also revealed a broader aspect of the 
constitutional debate. Both Constitutionalists and Republicans believed that their 
respective constitutional visions were inextricably tied to the character and fate of the 
Revolution. Constitutionalists thought that the constitution’s extensive institutionalization 
of the doctrine of popular sovereignty made it an ideal model of republican government. 
Republicans in turn argued that the document made excessive concessions to the people 
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and set the Commonwealth on the path to legislative tyranny. Adherents of both positions 
believed that proper constitutional structure was essential to securing the Revolution. 
The Council of Censors was the product of a unique provision in the state’s Frame 
of Government. The constitution provided for a septennial gathering consisting of two 
members from each city and county. This body was charged with both ensuring that the 
constitution had been “preserved inviolate in every part” and determining “whether the 
legislative and executive branches of government have performed their duty as guardians 
of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they 
are entitled to by the constitution.” It was authorized to send for “persons, papers, and 
records,” publicly censure individuals, order impeachments, and recommend the repeal of 
laws passed in violation of the constitution. The Censors were further given the power to 
amend the constitution “within two years after their sitting,” to alter laws they regarded 
as “defective,” to clarify ambiguous laws, and to introduce new laws deemed “necessary 
for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people.”103 The Council’s essential 
purpose was to ensure the “recurrence to fundamental principles” deemed necessary by 
the constitution’s Declaration of Rights.104 
Of all the powers it possessed, the Council of Censors’ authority to amend the 
constitution was the source of the most attention. Indeed, the prospect of amending the 
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constitution was the subject of enormous debate within the convention. Those dissatisfied 
with the contents of the Frame of Government established in 1776 and with the nature of 
the state’s politics in subsequent years proposed a series of changes intended to make the 
state government more balanced. These included the replacement of the Executive 
Council with a governor possessing the authority to veto bills and appoint officials, the 
creation of an upper house of the state legislature, and the creation of fixed salaries and 
life terms (contingent on “good behaviour”) for members of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.105 These measures would have reshaped the government of Pennsylvania along 
lines similar to those established by most of the other state constitutions adopted at the 
beginning of the American Revolution.106 
The Constitutionalist members of the convention decried these proposals, 
claiming that they would remold the Senate in the image of an “aristocratic nobility” and 
throttle the popular will in favor of the interests of the “wealthy and great.”107 While the 
debates over these proposals did not produce any changes to the constitution, they did 
reveal the extent to which its critics and supporters diverged on fundamental questions of 
constitutional philosophy. Constitutionalists were committed to preserving the state’s 
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ongoing experiment in exalting the popular will as the prime directive in government, 
while Republicans were determined to craft a system of government similar to those of 
the other states. Both parties recognized popular sovereignty. They differed, however, on 
the extent to which they though it should be institutionalized. Constitutionalists wished to 
see it unfettered, while Republicans wished to constrain it within clearly prescribed 
bounds.  
Tensions within the convention of Censors hinged on questions concerning the 
proper bounds of legislative authority. The revisionist element, comprised principally of 
Republicans who had from the outset opposed the state constitution, charged that the state 
legislature had completely abused its authority under the document and in the process 
reduced the supreme executive council and state supreme court to phantoms. They 
pointed to these actions as evidence of fundamental flaws in the constitution, contending 
that it had failed to impose the restraints on legislative power necessary to prevent the 
Assembly from becoming tyrannical.108 Constitutionalists argued that the constitution had 
created a proper distribution of powers. While they recognized that the legislature had on 
occasion violated the constitution, they believed that these incidences were not evidence 
of essential defects in the constitution, but simply isolated examples of the abuse of 
power.109 
The debates that occurred between Republican and Constitutionalist members of the 
Council revealed an enormous rift in constitutional ideology. Republicans emphasized 
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the importance of a tightly regulated balance of powers between the branches of 
government, arguing that it was the cornerstone of a viable political order. 
Constitutionalists, by contrast, esteemed the unrestrained expression of popular 
sovereignty as the foundation of good government. They viewed the introduction of 
amendments to the constitution intended to establish a clearly delineated balance of 
power as an impediment to popular government. They believed that the constitution had 
established a government genuinely accountable to and controllable by its constituents, 
and that the creation of a conventional balance of powers would undermine, if not 
outright obliterate, this state of affairs.  
I. Debates in the Council’s First Session 
 
In the Council of Censors’ first meeting, the constitution’s critics wielded a narrow 
[13-12] majority. While they did not possess the two-thirds majority necessary to call for 
a convention to amend the constitution, they hoped to publicize their criticisms of the 
document and thereby generate enough popular pressure on their Constitutionalist 
counterparts to force a convention.110 
From their slight majority vantage, Republicans issued a systematic critique of the 
distribution of power created in 1776. They argued that the unicameral nature of the state 
legislature was dangerous because it afforded factions with the opportunity to arise to 
dominance. Perhaps more tellingly, they submitted that the legislature’s single-chamber 
design offered opportunities for the body to “usurp” “legislative and judicial authority” --
                                                      
110 Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 156-7. 
 
 
59 
 
a prospect against which the people would have no recourse except revolution.111 To 
remedy these problems, they proposed a familiar solution: the creation of a bicameral 
legislature consisting of an upper house and a lower house. This was by no means an 
innovative solution. Bicameralism was a staple of Anglo-American political thought, 
expressed most notably in John Adams’s Thoughts on Government.112 Arguing that the 
state constitution was riddled with fatal defects, Republicans had a conventional remedy 
in mind. 
In addition to criticizing the preeminence of the legislature, the constitution’s critics 
also contended that the plenary design of the Executive Council made it a poor vehicle 
for decision-making. Rather than creating a Governorship, the constitution vested 
executive power in a nominal, mostly ineffectual, President and a twelve-person Supreme 
Executive Council.113 The revisionists saw the lack of a figurehead in instances of 
executive mistakes as a problem. They believed it was necessary to have someone in a 
position of accountability should the executive branch misbehave. The critical Censors 
also thought that a council was more dangerous to the Commonwealth than a governor 
would be, arguing that groups of men might be persuaded to engage in collective 
blunders they might not commit if left to their individual judgment.114 
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They further quibbled with the method of elections for the Executive Council’s 
President. The constitution provided for his election by the council’s members and the 
members of the general assembly. The Republican contingent of Censors argued that this 
mode of selection was dangerous because a President wielding a popular mandate might 
operate in ways detrimental to the good of the Commonwealth.115 The perennial fear of a 
demagogue taking advantage of popular support and becoming a tyrant seems to have 
animated this concern. However, in an apparent contradiction of the logic underpinning 
their concern, the revisionists proposed popular election to the Governorship.116 
Republicans proposed the creation of a governor’s position to streamline the decision-
making process and aggregate responsibility in the person of a single figurehead.117 They 
advocated granting the Governor a robust array of powers. The most important 
stipulation among these was that the governor possess a veto and thus wield a negative 
against any undesirable laws passed by the general assembly.118  
The constitution’s opponents expressed concerns about the executive branch that 
indicated they were not simply worried about the general assembly’s exercise of 
excessive power. Their abiding preoccupation with checking power and preventing 
tyranny from arising evidenced itself in their concern with restraining every branch of 
government. While the Republican members of the session were determined to expand 
the powers of the executive, they were not motivated by an overriding intention to 
establish it as the supreme branch, as their adversaries alleged. Rather, they were 
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committed to achieving a more conventional balance of power in the state government 
than existed under the 1776 constitution. 
The proponents of the constitutional status quo responded to these criticisms by first 
stating their belief in the “essential principle” that constitutions should not be “lightly 
changed,” and by noting the roadblocks to changes in “fundamental principles” 
established by the constitution. They observed the constitution’s requirement of a 2/3 
majority in the Censors for the calling of a convention to amend the document--noting by 
implication, it seemed, that “faults of so alarming a tendency” as to generate 
overwhelming demand for reform had not become apparent. They praised the stability 
this provision had provided and warned of the “continual fluctuations” in which its 
abandonment would result.119 
Constitutionalists further defended the constitution by appealing to the spirit of 
patriotic unanimity that had, they submitted, animated its framing and adoption. They 
painted a portrait of consensus and general devotion to the principles of the Patriot cause. 
The constitution had been adopted “with great harmony” at a time “when the flame of 
liberty shone brightest.” The people of the state had been “impressed with no other idea 
than that of acquiring and maintaining to themselves and their posterity, equal liberty.” 
The Constitutionalist members of the Council contrasted the unity and cohesion that 
existed at the time of the constitution’s adoption with the subsequent emergence of 
“factions” harboring “ambitious or mercenary motives.” They disregarded the rancor and 
contention that pervaded the post-convention debates of 1776. In their narrative of the 
                                                      
119 Ibid., 78. 
 
 
62 
 
constitution’s reception, the document had enjoyed an uncontested adoption. It had 
subsequently proven its merit by securing the state’s “safety and happiness” against the 
assaults of both “a most formidable enemy without,” [the British] and “a most 
indefatigable and insidious party within [Republicans]. ”120  
The Constitutionalist members of the Council were equating the critics of the 
constitution with the British--an extreme comparison which attested to their intense 
reverence for the document. To them, it seemed a direct product of the harmony, 
patriotism, and principles that set the Revolution in motion. In their eyes, the state 
constitution had encapsulated the “flame of liberty” and ensured its defense by 
establishing a sturdy governmental foundation capable of withstanding the exigencies of 
the war. By seeking to introduce significant changes to the constitution, the reformist 
element of the state’s political scene was engaged in a campaign to reverse the course of 
Independence and undermine the Revolutionary legacy. For Constitutionalists, the 
constitution was an embodiment of the Patriot cause, and any effort to substantively 
reshape it was an effort to undermine the accomplishments of the American Revolution 
in Pennsylvania. The constitution’s opponents were thus not working merely to amend 
Pennsylvania’s Frame of Government, but to abandon the American Revolution. Their 
campaign to uncover “faults and imperfections” was merely an “excuse” to dislodge a 
document that had “withstood the most arduous trial.” Further questioning the character 
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of the Republicans, Constitutionalists raised doubts about the “purity” of residents of 
“some parts of the state.”121 
The Constitutionalist counter against the Republican reform effort was steeped in 
rhetoric similar to that employed by the English Country school and revealed a profound 
immersion in the Whig paradigm.122 Constitutionalists appealed to the Whig 
apprehension about the dangers of government by elite interests, contending that the 
changes proposed by Republicans would produce a decidedly aristocratic frame of 
government. Referring to Republicans’ proposals for the creation of a bicameral 
legislature, Constitutionalists warned against the creation of “aristocratic ranks” among 
the citizenry. The dubbed the proposed governorship a “chief magistrate” and argued that 
his proposed scope of authority surpassed “those of the ordinary lot of kings.” They 
appealed to the people’s “love” for “equal liberty” and abhorrence toward “all attempts to 
lift one class of citizens above the heads of the rest, and much more the elevating any one 
citizen to the throne of royalty.” For Constitutionalists, the constitution’s genius and 
value derived from its simplicity: it assumed a homogeneous society, in which social rank 
and economic interests were not directly reflected in the structure of government.123  
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Republicans countered by presenting an account of the circumstances surrounding 
the constitution’s creation entirely different from the narrative cast by their opponents. 
They argued that the constitution was established under incredibly precarious 
circumstances: the “passions of the state” were “unusually agitated” in the midst of 
hostilities with Britain. Several “wise and able men” were absent from the state due either 
to obligations in the Continental Congress or the Continental Army. Under such 
unusually pressing circumstances, they asked “whether it was reasonable to expect that a 
constitution could be formed proper for a great and growing state?” Challenging the 
picture of constitutional consensus depicted by their opponents, they noted that there was 
significant opposition to the constitution’s adoption and that many had acceded to the 
document only under the assumption that it would be amended once the Council of 
Censors convened.124 
The Republican Censors appealed to the deliberative nature of the Council of 
Censors and the relatively peaceful circumstances that now existed in the state as reasons 
for amending the constitution. The “passions and prejudices” they saw as the source of 
the state constitution could be overturned in favor of “cool deliberation,”; indeed, “the 
intricate science of government” demanded it. Alluding to their status as the elite 
stewards of the state, they noted that “few have had either leisure or opportunities to turn 
their thoughts” towards the subject of government. Expressing an unabashedly deferential 
conception of politics, they suggested that those who had the leisure and opportunities 
necessary to consider matters of government should be placed at the forefront of affairs 
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of state. The people at large--or at least the relative political newcomers who had been 
present at the constitutional convention in the summer of 1776--were not, in their 
evaluation, as qualified to engage in the process of forming a government as their 
superiors.125 At the time of the constitution’s adoption, the state’s “political knowledge 
was in its infancy.” It had now matured and was sufficient to correct the deficiencies of 
the constitution.126 
The revisionists further challenged the Constitutionalists’ assertions about the 
constitution’s success in guiding the Commonwealth through the war. They denied that 
the constitution was the source of the state’s successes against Britain. Rather, “all the 
exertions of Pennsylvania,” were attributable to the “virtue of the people.” This virtue, 
not the constitution, had enabled Pennsylvanians to withstand the travails of wartime. If 
anything, the constitution had been a burden on the people and an obstacle to their 
successes in the war. Unlike Constitutionalists, Republicans did not identify the cause of 
the Revolution with the constitution. Nor did they think the constitution a suitable 
mechanism for realizing its fulfillment. They believed that the principles of the 
Revolution were carried by the people, not inscribed in the constitution. The people, and 
the people alone, had the potential to achieve independence and secure liberty.127 
 
                                                      
125 Ibid., 81. On the authors of the Pennsylvania constitution, see  Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776; Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America; Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 637; Nash, 
“Philadelphia’s Radical Caucus that Propelled Pennsylvania to Independence and Democracy,” in Alfred F. 
Young, Gary B. Nash, and Ray Raphael, eds., Revolutionary Founders: Rebels, Radicals, and Reformers in 
the Making of the Nation (New York: Vintage, 2011), 67-85. 
126 Proceedings, 81. 
127 Ibid. 
 
 
66 
 
II. Making the Debate Public: The Pamphlet War 
 
Republicans took to the press to support their claims about the Constitution, 
publishing a number of pamphlets to present their views to the public. They succinctly 
presented the essence of their case against the document in An Address of the Council of 
Censors to the Freemen of Pennsylvania and presented a systematic exposition of their 
positions on the Constitution in A Candid Examination of the Address of the Minority of 
Council of Censors to the People of Pennsylvania. While the arguments presented in 
those pamphlets largely resembled those issued in the course of the Council’s 
proceedings, they provide an enhanced understanding of the nature of Republicans’ 
grievances. 
An Address acknowledged the Republicans’ fixation on the constitution, 
recognizing its amendment as “the most weighty matter” addressed within the Council. 
Apparently intending to highlight its differences from the other state constitutions, the 
Republicans remarked that the Council had “compared it with the constitutions of the 
other states.” They emphasized that their proposed amendments to the constitution would 
bring the Frame of Government into alignment with the governmental structures 
established under other state constitutions, noting that their proposals were “not 
experiments,” but were “founded on the reason and the experience of our sister states.” In 
their appeal to the people, the Republicans were explicit about their intention to create a 
state government that adhered to the conventional wisdoms about government 
represented in most of the other state constitutions.128 
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They also asserted their Patriot credentials. They denied the notion that their 
interests in any way differed from those of their constituents. Rather, they presented their 
motives as grounded in a vigor for the Whig cause. Their “political principles,” were 
proven, they argued, by their place as “the consistent opposers of our British foes.” This 
status as ardent Patriots was confirmed by the fact that “most of us have risqued our lives 
and fortunes during the whole of the contest.” In a state where Loyalist sentiment was 
seemingly strong, and a large segment of the population was accused of supporting the 
British cause by refusing to take part in the war effort, Republicans were trying to 
demonstrate that their brand of constitutionalism was inspired by and consistent with the 
military valor they displayed through individual sacrifice and bravery on the 
battlefield.129  
Where An Address was cursory, A Candid Examination was much more 
substantial in scope. The Republican authors essayed a broad range of topics and 
provided an exhaustive presentation of their stances on the constitution. In the process of 
criticizing the constitution, the authors disclosed a number of their fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of power, the relationship between the government and the 
governed, and the implications those notions had for governmental structure. 
The authors presented perhaps the most compelling explanation of any 
Republican apology regarding the need for a strong Executive. They argued that semantic 
distinctions “A King, a Governor, [or] a President,” were of little importance. What really 
mattered was that such a “Chief Magistrate” be established, because “our nature and the 
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social state,” required the existence of an executive element of the government. The 
alternative, they contended, was a degeneration of Pennsylvanians into “savages to a state 
of society.” While they acknowledged that constraints on executive power were 
indispensable, the natural inclinations of humanity towards disorder required that a 
counterposing force be applied in the form of a strong and viable executive figure. In the 
same passage, however, they asserted that this constraining force needed to itself be 
subjected to restraints. They emphasized the importance of a balance of power, stating: 
“Power must be delegated; and if that power is not balanced, give your government what 
name you please, you will find it but a name, and you are slaves.”130 The authors argued 
that because their proposed governorship would be elective, the executive branch would 
be more accountable to the people than the Supreme Executive Council in place under the 
constitution, while still possessing the energy necessary to counteract the legislative and 
judicial branches.131 
A Candid Examination also addressed Republicans’ perception that the 
constitution had failed to safeguard the state judiciary against political pressures. The 
authors argued that the document’s twenty-third section, which made members of the 
state supreme court “removable for misbehavior at any time by the general assembly,” 
effectively gave the legislature undue leverage over the court’s justices and “annihilates 
the liberties of Pennsylvania in a single blow.”132 It made the legislature “at once the 
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accusers, the witnesses, and the judges” of the state judiciary.133 Just as they contended 
that the executive needed to be free of legislative influence, they argued that the judiciary 
should be completely independent from outside pressures. Courts, they argued, “should 
be incapable of influence or corruption.” They needed to be not only independent, but 
“wholly independent—of the Assembly, of the Council—nay more, of the people.” The 
authors warned that “Liberty, property, and life,” were all imperiled when such a degree 
of absolute judicial independence was not maintained. They believed that even the 
slightest participle of legislative influence compromised the judiciary, which served a 
similar purpose to the state as “the powers of conscience” did to the mind.134 
Another aspect of the authors’ critique of the constitution was their contention 
that the document was in no sense connected to the war effort in Pennsylvania. The 
Republican critics assailed the idea that the constitution’s preservation had been the 
object of the state’s participants in the military contest with Great Britain. They found the 
notion that the constitution had been paid for by “the blood of thousands,” inconceivable. 
They questioned the commitment of the constitution’s authors to the Patriot cause, noting 
that “The friends to the constitution have indeed assumed the name of whigs,” but that a 
number of them “withdrew themselves from the field of danger, immediately” upon the 
constitution’s adoption. The genuine supporters of the Revolutionary cause, “Those who 
persevered in support of the liberties of America,” were generally opposed to the 
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constitution, being “too much enlightened, to shed their blood in support for a system that 
was to render them unhappy and their country despicable.”135  
The Republican authors equated the system of government established under the 
constitution with the “British tyranny” the newly formed United States were fighting to 
overthrow. They questioned whether it was possible “that the men who have fought 
through the whole course of the war, and submitted to hardships that in age or country an 
army ever sustained before, to emancipate you from British tyranny, should be the friends 
of that tyranny?” Drawing a connection between Pennsylvania soldiers’ opposition to 
Britain and their hostility towards the state constitution, the authors asked, “are they not, 
almost to a man, averse to the present constitution?” Not only did the constitution fail to 
attain the credence of an embodiment of Revolutionary principles, the authors further 
suggested that it was little better than the British policies that had prompted the 
Americans’ effort to separate themselves from the empire.136 The authors concurrently 
questioned the commitment of the constitution’s authors to the Patriot cause by throwing 
doubt on their military service and made it clear that they distinguished between the 
cause of the war effort and the maintenance of the constitution. 
The authors also stressed the resemblance between their proposed revisions to the 
constitution and the governmental structures created under the constitutions established 
by the majority of the other states. They noted that “Maryland and Delaware on one side, 
and New-Jersey, New-York, Connecticut, Rhode-Island, and New Hampshire, all have 
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governments similar to that we have recommended to you.” They pointed to those states’ 
constitutions as evidence that the governors and upper houses did not necessarily have to 
morph into “either a King or a House of Lords.” It was possible, they argued, to establish 
“wisdom in their legislatures” and “energy in their executive branches” without 
producing a tyrannical regime. By placing their proposals within the mainstream of 
American constitutionalism during the Revolution, the Republicans were both endorsing 
conventional governmental structures and suggesting that their program was in alignment 
with the prevailing wisdom of the time.137 
A Candid Examination also presented a decidedly republican account of the 
proper scope of the electorate. They argued that the constitution’s failure to require of 
voters and officeholders anything greater than a “common interest” with the community 
was an insufficiently high threshold for political participation. They presented “This tie, 
by means of life” as “the most common of any that men can have to a government,” but 
argued that it was “by no means sufficient to entitle a man to dispose of the liberty or 
property of his fellow citizens.” By granting direct political authority to every individual, 
the constitution had, the Republicans argued, made it possible for those without a 
substantial stake in the interests of the commonwealth to abuse their authority and divest 
their fellow citizens of their liberty and property.138 
The authors identified property as the cornerstone of government. They argued 
that “Nine tenths of all laws relate to the disposal of property,” noting that government’s 
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origins could be traced to the emergence of the concept of property. They contended that 
liberty and life needed fewer legal protections to survive than did property. They argued 
that it was “absurd therefore for any man to dispose of his neighbor’s property, who has 
no property himself.” A government that facilitated such a state of affairs was inherently 
“unequal” and productive of aristocracy or monarchy.139 Appealing to the civic humanist 
ideal of the independent freeholder, they posited that “An independent share of property 
in an elector is the only thing that can make him independent, or secure the state against 
the various species of corruption which prevail at elections.”140  
The authors were presenting a vision of society that clashed directly with the 
more socially egalitarian vision articulated by Constitutionalists. Constitutionalists 
viewed the community as a corporate entity animated by the popular will and not 
particularly reliant on individual virtue. They thought that a constitutional order that 
upheld the interests of society by heeding the voice of all white men was the best way of 
promoting the common good. Republicans differed, arguing that, while the interests of 
society were paramount, the individual property-holder was the foundation of society. 
Republicans believed that the virtuous individual was the cornerstone of a free society 
and that such virtue could only exist under a government that carefully protected 
individual rights, especially the right to hold property. This required serious restrictions 
on the political power of those who did not hold property and were therefore not virtuous. 
On this issue, both factions were living up to their names. Constitutionalists believed that 
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a proper constitutional order (which they believed meant a system that promoted societal 
interests and the popular will) was the best way of achieving a free society. Republicans 
thought that individual virtue was the basis of a free society and that extensive constraints 
on the political power of a large segment of the population were necessary to ensure that 
government could survive. 
Constitutionalist members of the Council of Censors countered the Republican 
appeal to the electorate by publishing their own pamphlets intended to generate public 
opposition against the reform campaign in which Republicans were engaged. The authors 
of To the freemen of Pennsylvania depicted the contest over the constitution as a struggle 
between “liberty and slavery”—a dreadful prospect, they argued, in a state “where the 
light of science the love of liberty shine with peculiar lustre.” They appealed to concerns 
about the transfer of property—although, unlike Republicans, they were unconcerned 
about the dangers of the masses using political power to seize the property of elites. 
Rather, they expressed apprehension about “the people, and their property, being 
delivered into the hands of a set of tyrants,” and argued that such a development was 
inevitable if Pennsylvanians ever decided to “suffer the executive to intrench upon the 
other branches.”141 
While To the freemen of Pennsylvania expressed a general concern about the 
dangers of executive power without exploring the ways in which such a threat was facing 
Pennsylvania, the writers of An Alarm. To the freemen and electors of Pennsylvania were 
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more specific. They accused Republicans of attempting to place “the principal part of the 
power of the state” in the Supreme Executive Council. They painted Republicans’ 
accusations of wrongdoing by the Assembly as a series of unfair slights against “the 
dignity of the Legislature,” which occupied a special place in the state government, 
“compos[ing] a just and equal representation of the people.” 
The pamphlet also questioned Republicans’ commitment to the war effort, 
challenging the assertions made by the constitution’s opponents that they had been ardent 
and longsuffering in their devotion to the conflict. It presented Republicans as ineffectual 
in their support for the military conflict and suggested that some might be concealing past 
support for Britain: 
With all their boasted pretensions to early and decided whiggism, most of them 
were skulkers under petty offices, or pretended indisposition. Their patriotism has 
seldom extended beyond bawling in a Coffee-House or Tavern, or insulting the 
persons or seizing the property of the tories. Many of them were downright tories 
themselves in the beginning of the war, and now affect a mighty zeal for your 
liberties, only to throw a cover on their former baseness.142 
Republicans emerged from this scathing characterization as, at best, insubstantial 
in their contributions to the War for Independence, or, at worst, as Loyalists who 
were currently feigning support for the Patriot effort. Both A Candid Examination 
and An Alarm indicated the extent to which partisans in the constitutional debate 
attempted to solidify their status as active contributors to the war effort and 
dismiss their opponents as obstacles to American victory. They also suggested 
that the constitution’s supporters and opponents equated the Revolution as a 
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political process with the War for Independence and therefore sought to 
demonstrate the validity of their respective stances on the constitution by pointing 
to their own experience in fighting the war and thus making the Revolution’s 
fulfillment possible. 
III. Contesting the Constitution in the Second Session 
 
Debates over the state constitution were not conclusively settled when the Council of 
Censors adjourned early in 1784, the Republican majority having failed to produce the 
amending convention they initially hoped for. The body reconvened late in the summer of 
that year and picked up where the first session left off. Both sides continued to grapple, as 
heatedly as before and still to little apparent avail, over the viability of the constitution. 
Republicans’ prospects of amending the constitution appeared even dimmer than they had 
previously--a Republican member of the Council resigned and was replaced by 
prominent Constitutionalist George Bryan, three other Constitutionalists were added to 
the Council, and a Republican member decided not to attend the second session. These 
developments gave the Constitutionalists a clear majority in the Council and effectively 
foreclosed the possibility of an amending convention being called.143 The deliberations of 
the Censors’ second session were unfruitful, yet they warrant attention because of the 
insights they provide into the attitudes towards altering the constitution voiced by both 
sides of the debate. 
In the second session, the constitution’s defenders again asserted that popular 
sovereignty was the basis for the document. They explicitly recognized its concessions to 
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popular control of government. They posited that it reposed “all civil power on the 
authority of the people only, in whom the sovereignty resides.” The government 
enshrined “the natural rights of individuals” as the source of political authority. They 
argued, contrary to the assertions of their Republican adversaries, that the constitution 
had successfully divided power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 
They found the constitution “clear in its principles, accurate in its form, consistent in its 
several parts, and worthy of the veneration of the good people of Pennsylvania.”144 
One of the best features of the constitution, in their appraisal, was its preclusion of 
the “accumulation of influence, in the hands of one or few.” The Constitutionalists 
described such a development as “subversive of all public justice and private right” and 
favorable to the “capricious, unsteady domination of prejudice, party and self-interest,” 
not government by “laws prescribed, promulgated, and known.” They believed that the 
emergence of elite political factions was incompatible with the rule of law. In their eyes, 
the “capricious” and “unsteady” nature of aristocratic rule precluded the kind of steady 
and deliberative government administered under a legally attuned regime.145  
As if performing a suite of familiar compositions, the Constitutionalists were playing 
on a number of well-known themes without exploring any of them in great depth or 
detail. In the same passage, the Constitutionalists appealed to popular sovereignty and the 
enshrinement of individual rights while concurrently expressing hostility towards elite 
factionalism and arbitrary government. For the constitution’s supporters, popular control 
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of government, individual rights, and the rule of law were mutually reinforcing and 
inextricably interwoven.146 Unchecked popular sovereignty, as represented in the existing 
legislature, was in their estimation the foundation for the enjoyment of individual rights 
and protection against the domination of aristocratic interests determined to impose their 
arbitrary will upon the Commonwealth. 
Revisionists countered by charging that the legislature had operated in a manner that 
was excessively energetic and insufficiently deliberative. They invoked John Locke--
perhaps an interesting choice, given the abundance of sources on the rule of law from 
which they could have chosen--in submitting that the law necessitated stability and 
should not be the result of arbitrary actions on the part of the legislature.147 They 
contended that the legislature’s conduct had been subversive of the rule of law--it was as 
unpredictable as the “aristocratic” mode of government assailed by the convention’s 
Constitutionalist contingent. This pointed to what they regarded as a fatal defect with the 
constitution: its failure to constrain the legislature to an established sphere of authority 
and pattern of behavior.  
After a series of debates over various actions taken by the legislature since the 
Constitution’s adoption, the clashing parties resumed debate over the nature and bounds 
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of popular sovereignty. Rejecting the reformers’ argument that the power to appoint 
officers to positions not enumerated by the constitution by default resided with the 
Supreme Executive Council, the Constitutionalists appealed to the legislature’s role as the 
representative of the popular will.148 The legislature was the “proper depository of all 
power not expressly placed elsewhere; for there, every man in the community is equally 
represented.” In contrast, the Executive Council was not subject to popular oversight and 
could operate in ways contradictory of the wishes of the people. Worse yet, the people 
were left with little recourse against such violations of the popular will. The legislature’s 
proximity to and accountability to the people made it a better vehicle for realizing the 
interests of the people. Constitutionalists’ exposition of the virtues of legislative primacy 
was telling. They believed that any obstructions to the people’s ability to dictate 
governmental policy were invitations to arbitrary rule.149  
The preservationist faction believed that reformers were intent to establish the 
Executive Council as the principal lawmaking body and effectively strip the legislature of 
its power. They pointed to a 1779 proposal that the executive be given the authority “to 
prepare such business as to them shall seem necessary to lay before the general 
assembly” as evidence of an effort to grant the council the ability to dictate the terms 
upon which pieces of legislature were introduced. They greatly exaggerated the scope of 
this proposal; it did not openly curtail the legislature’s power to introduce legislation. 
They equated motive with substance and assumed that their opponents’ proposals had 
been animated by a desire to establish the Executive Council as the chief lawmaking 
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body. The preservationists claimed that the measure would quickly result in the Council 
claiming sole authority over the process of introducing laws and control over debate. 
They argued that affairs would shortly operate under the premise “that no law should pass 
that had not originated with the council.” In their depiction, the proposal was part of an 
effort to produce an executive wielding “the appointment to all offices; the originating all 
laws; and a negative before debate.”150 
Despite these charges, the revisionist element remained adamant about the 
importance of preserving executive power against perceived encroachments by the 
legislature. They again emphasized the importance of allowing the executive to draw 
funds from the treasury, a claim Constitutionalists rejected by asserting the legislature’s 
exclusive power over drawing money from the treasury.151 Reiterating the importance of 
judicial independence, they argued that the Executive Council’s ability to draw funds 
from the treasury was essential to the fixing of state supreme court justices’ salaries. 
They portrayed this measure as necessary to insulate justices from constant pressure to 
accord with popular sentiment in their rulings.152  
Constitutionalists countered the allegations made against them by their opponents, 
issuing the strongest accusations yet fielded by either party in the debates of the Council 
of Censors. They railed against that the revisionists’ interpretation of the constitution in 
favor of executive prerogative, arguing that it evidenced a plot to construct “the most 
complete system of aristocratic tyranny, that has ever appeared in the world.” Here were 
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explicit charges that their adversaries were conspiring to swiftly and fundamentally 
transform the state government from a popular model to an aristocratic one. They noted 
that such changes in government had historically occurred “by slow and almost insensible 
changes.” However, Republicans had forgone the usual method of instituting aristocracy 
through a series of gradual steps. Rather than subtly and slowly working towards the 
establishment of an aristocratic regime, they had resolved to implement it “by one stroke 
of a pen, and to persuade the people that they ought always to have been so governed.” 
Despite their admonitions against this effort to suddenly foist an aristocracy upon the 
Commonwealth, the Constitutionalists expressed faith in the resoluteness of the people. 
The citizens of Pennsylvania were in their estimation “too enlightened...too high spirited, 
and too fond of liberty” to submit to becoming the “mere registers of their haughty and 
imperious masters.”153  
Yet again, Constitutionalists appealed to what they regarded as the principles of the 
American Revolution: enlightenment, the high-spiritedness of the people, and liberty. 
Their identification of the reformers’ construction of the state constitution as evidence of 
an aristocratic conspiracy, as well as the seemingly hyperbolic epithets they attached to 
their opponents, are indicative of the Constitutionalists’ preoccupation with the spirit of 
the Revolution and their indebtedness to the Country outlook on politics. 
The debates that took place both in the meetings of the Council of Censors in 1783 
and 1784, and in members’ published efforts to secure the backing of popular sentiment 
revolved around questions of popular sovereignty and the proper distribution of powers 
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between the branches of government. They also implicated competing visions of the 
American Revolution and its meaning that were connected indissolubly to the Censors’ 
fundamental disagreements on those questions. While Republicans and Constitutionalists 
alike recognized and affirmed popular sovereignty, they altogether disagreed on its 
implications. 
Republicans believed that in order to secure the Revolution, a clearly delineated 
balance of powers between the three branches of government needed to be achieved. This 
contention was largely motivated by their belief that constraints on legislative power 
needed to be established. Republicans cited a litany of misdeeds committed by the state 
legislature since the constitution’s adoption. While these abuses of power undoubtedly 
informed the Republican outlook on the nature and proper scope of legislative power, 
they were not the source of the preservationists’ conception of a rightful constitutional 
legislature. Underpinning their allegations against the transgressions of the state 
legislature was a conviction that it simply possessed too much power. Republicans were 
philosophically opposed to the preeminence of the legislature and believed that until 
written constraints on its power were established, it would continue to misbehave. They 
thought that an excess of legislative power threatened to jeopardize the Revolution. 
Despite arguing that the people had sustained Pennsylvania through the War for 
Independence and acknowledging the sovereignty of the people, they still submitted that 
restraints on the direct expression of the people’s will needed to be established.154 
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Constitutionalists could scarcely have been any farther away from Republicans on 
these issues. They associated the constitution and its concessions to direct popular rule 
with the spirit of the Revolution. They thought that unrestrained control of the 
government by the people was interchangeable with the cause of the American 
Revolution. Therefore, they argued, proposals for establishing constraints on the political 
agency of the people were, by extension, overtures towards an abandonment of the 
Revolution. This explains their seemingly irrational contention that Republicans were 
scarcely more congenial towards the cause of the Revolution than the British Empire was. 
These arguments were informed by the rhetoric and outlook of the Whig tradition. But 
they were not simply its product. Rather, they evidenced a fervor for popular sovereignty 
that cannot be ascribed solely to the influence of the “paranoid style” in Anglo-American 
politics.155 It was a mania shaped indelibly by the Constitutionalists’ understanding that 
their conception of popular sovereignty, which was reflected in the state constitution, was 
inseparable from the cause of the American Revolution. For them, the Revolution was a 
project in realizing the possibilities of direct legislative representation. 
The Council of Censors’ deliberations did not ultimately produce any changes in the 
structure of the Pennsylvania government. The constitution remained intact, the 
revisionists flustered in their efforts to amend it and the preservationists satisfied that 
they had blocked an effort to sacrifice popular government on the altars of aristocratic 
domination and executive prerogative. However, the issues over which the two parties 
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within the Council of Censors clashed continued to inspire debate and define the contours 
of state politics.156 The constitution of 1776 remained a point of intense contention, 
inspiring unflagging support from its partisans and inexorable criticism from its 
detractors. Perhaps most importantly, the debate over the constitution revealed both 
parties’ conscious identification with the spirit and cause of the Revolution.  
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Conclusion 
The Pennsylvania constitution remained intact until 1790, when its critics finally 
succeeded in replacing it with a constitution that accorded more closely with traditional 
notions about government. In the interim, it remained a consistent object of debate. The 
constitutional debate extended well beyond the conclusion of hostilities with Britain and 
overlapped with the state’s debates over ratifying the Federal Constitution in 1787. 
Constitutional discord was a persistent source of tension throughout the 1780s.  
The length and intensity of the constitutional debate prompt several questions. 
Why would a constitution adopted by partisans of the Patriot movement provoke such 
controversy among the state’s proponents of independence? How could such an 
embattled document withstand constant assaults and outlive the United States’ first 
founding document, the Articles of Confederation? In light of the extensive disagreement 
over the document’s suitability for guiding the state through the War for Independence, 
why would the debate rage on after independence had been gained and the war 
concluded? 
The only satisfactory answer to these questions is that disagreement on the 
constitution arose from such fundamental division over central questions of governmental 
order that compromise was unthinkable. Constitutionalists and Republicans believed they 
were vying for the direction of the Revolution in their battle over the constitution 
Constitutionalists argued that a governmental structure that closely adhered to the 
notion of popular sovereignty was crucial to maintaining liberty. They contended that 
direct representation of the popular will, coupled with an abandonment of traditional 
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mechanisms for dividing power, were the best means of achieving this. Republicans 
countered that such an arrangement flew in the face of prevailing arguments about the 
importance of balancing power and the dangers of conferring an excess of direct control 
to the people.  
At its core, the debate between the constitution’s supporters and critics was an 
internal contest to determine the nature and course of politics in Pennsylvania. They were 
not concerned merely with achieving home rule, and the central issue at stake was not 
determining which societal interest should govern. Both parties agreed that independence 
was essential. And while socioeconomic considerations were sometimes voiced, they did 
not predominate, and Constitutionalists and Republicans were not clearly divided along 
social or economic lines. A Whiggish interpretation stressing the unanimity and concord 
of Patriots does not provide a satisfactory understanding of Pennsylvania’s politics during 
the Revolutionary period. Neither does the Progressive approach, with its emphasis on 
the disorder wrought by a multiplicity of adversarial interests.  
The Pennsylvania political debate can best be explained as an internal contest 
animated primarily by conflicting visions of government. While these visions cannot be 
neatly attributed to clearly identifiable sources of inspiration, they were apparent from the 
constitution’s adoption. This indicates that the ideologies were latent, embedded 
somewhere within the state’s political consciousness. The coinciding of hostilities with 
Britain and the adoption of the constitution provided the impetus for these distinct visions 
of governmental order to be expressed. The constitution’s authors envisioned a political 
community bound together by a common commitment to the principles of popular 
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government. Instead, they created a governing document which inspired extensive 
conflict, demonstrating the centrality of constitutional principles to political debate and 
the ways in which Patriots of various stripes understood the American Revolution.
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